Juridical and financial considerations on the public re capitalisation and rescue of financial institutions during periods of financial crises (Part I) by Ojo, Marianne & Rodríguez-Miguez, Jose
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Juridical and financial considerations on
the public re capitalisation and rescue of
financial institutions during periods of
financial crises (Part I)
Marianne Ojo and Jose Rodr´ıguez-Miguez
Center for European Law and Politics, University of Bremen, Oxford
Brookes University, King’s College London
23. July 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24047/
MPRA Paper No. 24047, posted 23. July 2010 07:05 UTC
ABSTRACT
As  well  as  a  consideration  of  why  the  lender  of  last  resort  facility  should  be  used  for 
emergency situations and systemically relevant institutions in particular, an interesting point 
which will be considered in this paper is the comparison between the European Central Bank 
(ECB)  Recommendation  and  its  application  by  the  Commission  in  the  Re  capitalisation 
Communication,  specifically  with  its  Annex,  where  the  Commission  explains  how  it 
determines the price of equity (ordinary or common shares) - balancing the “real value” with 
the “market value” within a crisis context. 
Whether the Commission and Member States have applied this methodology in determining 
the price of equity with respect to the capital of banks acquired by Member States, will also 
be addressed.  Such consideration could provide a vital key to determining the real value of 
State Aid and the best possible price for which capital could be sold.
Given the  scale  of  government  intervention  and State  rescues  which  occurred  during  the 
recent  crisis  –  as  well  as  the  prominence  accorded  to  measures  aimed  at  preventing  and 
limiting distortions of competition, calls have been made for competition authorities to take 
on more formidable roles in designing and implementing exit strategies. In order to foster 
competition as much as possible, it is proposed that ”governments should provide financial 
institutions with incentives to prevent them from depending on government support once the 
economy begins to recover.”
Key Words: Financial Crisis, re capitalisation, guarantees, Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP), fundamentally sound institutions, rescues.
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Juridical and Financial Considerations on the Public Re 
capitalisation and Rescue of Financial Institutions During Periods 
of Financial Crises (Part I)
Jose Rodríguez-Miguez1 and Marianne Ojo2
1. Introduction: The Crisis as a Context of Reference
The recent Financial Crisis, which started in 2007 – culminating in 2008, is still generating a 
considerable number of related and published articles. According to most of these sources, the 
“sub prime” crisis is considered to be the “root” cause of all present and future challenges. 
However, this is just part of the story.3 There were, and still are, specific and deep rooted 
problems in the financial system itself - problems such as those related to the supervision of 
central banks (how supervision should be carried out); the role of rating agencies (what role 
should be assumed by rating agencies); the management of risk by individual entities, and so 
on.
Even though it is evident that the Crisis began in the US, its rapid dissemination has been 
attributed to many other different factors – most of them linked to the globalisation of the 
financial system. However, it is evident that the degree of variation and intensity of the Crisis, 
from  one  country  to  another,  is  dependent  on  individual  circumstances.  Apparently,  it 
constitutes  more  than  just  a  simple  case  of  the  so  called  “domino  effect”  –more  like  a 
“tsunami”4 effect  for the international  financial  system – as observed and noted by many 
headlines.
From an economic point of view, the best and clearest reference point to such a crisis would 
be the Big Crash of 1929. The credibility of audited financial statements – both at domestic 
and global levels, was the most significant victim of that particular Crisis. It is easy to forget 
that  the sustenance and growth of financial  markets  is dependent on such credibility.  The 
typical image and perception of a banker – like the image perceived of a British gentleman 
(with  the  classical  bowler  hat)  or  that  of  the  serious  Wall  Street  broker  or  financier,  as 
transmitted across screens to the general public, was really deceptive.
This  being  the  case,  because  the  classic  perception  was  being  transformed  dramatically. 
Moreover the images perceived from the 1929 Crisis has remained in the sub conscious minds 
of many and such perceptions have constituted lasting and dramatic reminders of the 1929 
Crisis.
Further,  the  key question  is  how to  transform the  Crisis  into  an  opportunity  in  order  to 
minimise tax burdens to taxpayers – as well as making the financial markets more efficient. 
This is the primary reason why this paper focuses on the public re capitalisations of financial 
institutions.  It approaches this objective through a consideration of how (they existed) ; a 
1Visiting Scholar at King’s College School of Law. University of London jarmiguez@gmail.com 
2Researcher, Center for European Law and Politics (ZERP) University of Bremen and Teaching Associate, 
Oxford Brookes University, Oxford marianneojo@hotmail.com
3 In other words, this partial diagnosis constitutes just a fraction of the antidote – and not the entire prescription.
4 Even with the prevailing and grave conditions of many financial institutions,  many of these have managed to 
survive, on the short term. However it’s possible that such an event will occur in the medium-long term, when 
the restructuring plans are examined, in the case of the European Union, by the European Commission.
consideration of the conditions under which they existed; as well as through a comparative 
analysis of these data with the Swedish experiences at the start of the nineties – when the 
Swedish Government assumed control of several private banks and subsequently, following 
an intense restructuring process, privatised these banks – hence generating income for the 
Treasury.  (Comparative  analyses  with  the  Swedish  experiences  will  be  considered  in  the 
second part to this paper).
However, we should not forget that during that period of the Crisis, Sweden was not yet a 
member of the European Union5, hence it was not subject to European State Aid control.6 It is 
clear that the State Aid received in form of equity participations (ordinary capital and other 
types of shares), provides the Government with the means of transforming the management of 
firms in difficulties as well as the facilities to make sound decisions in relation to the future of 
such firms.
In response to the recent Financial Crisis - after it had been widely accepted that “a serious 
disturbance in the economy of Member States” had occurred, and that several measures were 
required to remedy this disturbance, various Commission communications were adopted and 
these include: The Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in 
relation  to  financial  institutions  in  the  context  of  the current  global  financial  crisis  
(hereinafter "the Banking Communication"), its  Communication on the re capitalisation of  
financial  institutions  in  the  current  financial  crisis:  limitation  of  aid  to  the  minimum 
necessary  and  safeguards  against  undue  distortions  of  competition  (hereinafter  "the  Re 
capitalisation Communication"),  and its  Communication on the return to viability and the  
assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the 
State  aid  rules  (hereinafter  "the  Restructuring  Communication").”  The  Banking  and  Re 
capitalisation Communications will constitute the focus of this study.
Purpose of the Banking Communication
The purpose of the Commission’s Communication on the “the application of State aid rules to 
measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial 
crisis” (hereinafter referred to as the Banking Communication),7 is namely, “the provision of 
guidance on the criteria relevant for the compatibility with the Treaty of general schemes, as 
well  as  individual  cases  of  application  of  such  schemes  and  ad  hoc  cases  of  systemic 
relevance.”8
The adoption of appropriate measures to safeguard the stability of the financial system was 
considered necessary, as well as vital, by the Commission – owing to:9
- the scale of the Financial Crisis (such that the viability of fundamentally sound banks 
was also being placed at risk
- the high degree of integration and interdependence of European financial markets and
5 Sweden has been a member of the EU since 1995.
6 Nevertheless, Sweden was a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which has equivalent 
rules to that of the European State Aid control, under the control of the Surveillance Authority.
7 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to 
measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis” (2008/C 
270/02)
8 See section 1 paragraph 5;ibid
9 See section 1 paragraph 4; ibid
- the drastic repercussions of the potential failure of a systemically relevant financial 
institution – which could contribute to further aggravation of the Crisis.
Such peculiar nature of the recent Financial Crisis, as illustrated above, and with particular 
reference to systemic repercussions, has also promulgated the realisation that an extension of 
measures beyond those necessary to safeguard the stability of the financial system, to include 
general schemes, may be required.10
A number of factors considered to have triggered the recent Financial Crisis include:11
i) Macro  economic  issues  such  as  low interest  rates  in  the  United  States  which 
helped create widespread housing bubbles whose developments were fuelled by 
insufficiently regulated mortgage lending and securitisation financing techniques
ii) Poor risk management by issuers of structured financial products
iii) Underestimation by credit rating agencies of the credit default risks of instruments 
collateralised by sub prime mortgages
iv) Corporate governance failures in financial firms – where the complex nature of 
financial products was not adequately understood
v) Regulatory, supervisory and crisis management failures.
In classifying the above mentioned factors into two, reference is made to the observations in 
the Communication12 where the impact of general market conditions not only contributed to 
the  difficulties  experienced  by  even  fundamentally  sound  financial  institutions,  but  also 
severely restricting  their  access  to liquidity.  Further factors  which contributed to  liquidity 
problems included  “the pervasive  uncertainty about  the  credit  risk of  individual  financial 
institutions – which not only facilitated the process of exhausting sources and facilities for 
inter bank lending, but also consequentially resulted in the restriction of access to liquidity for 
such financial institutions.13 Such exogenous factors attributed to the impact of general market 
conditions  constitute  one  of  the  classes  into  which  the  above  mentioned  factors  will  be 
classified and (i) provides the best illustration of these.
“Financial institutions with problems that are a result of their particular business model or 
business  practices  whose  weaknesses  are  exposed  and  exacerbated  by  the  crisis  in  the 
financial  markets,”14 constitute  the  other  half  of  the  classification  and  (ii)-(v)  could  be 
considered to fall under this category. Such management inefficiency induced problems are 
considered  to  require  greater  “far  reaching”  restructuring  arrangements  than  the  other 
category.  As  highlighted  in  the  paper,15 signals  should  be  sent  to  management  of  firms 
considered  to  be  “too big  to  fail”  that  their  importance  (in  terms  of  the threats  posed to 
systemic  stability  –  where  they  are  permitted  to  fail)  does  not  provide  an  excuse  for 
management  of  such  firms  to  act  recklessly  –  reckless  behaviour  being  attributed  to  the 
knowledge  that  in  any  case,  government  bail  outs  would  be  provided  in  the  event  of  a 
likelihood that financial failure may occur. Intensive restructuring, to the extent that the entire 
10 ibid
11 A Petrovic and R Tutsch, „National Rescue Measures in Response to the Current Financial Crisis” ECB Legal 
Working Paper Series No 8/ July 2009 at page 6 http://www.ecb.europa.eu and 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1430489
12 European Commission, “Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to 
measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis” (2008/C 
270/02);paragraph 2
13 see ibid; paragraph 1
14 ibid;paragraph 2
15 “See M Ojo, “Liquidity Assistance and the Provision of State Aids to Financial Institutions” 2010 Munich 
RePec and SSRN Working Papers.
management of a rescued firm, whose failure is attributed to management inefficiencies, is 
replaced in the event of an institutional failure, provides an illustration of such a warning.
An example  of the devastating effects  of interconnectedness between financial  markets  is 
illustrated by the consequences of the problems triggered within the US financial sector in 
2008 which affected financial institutions in Europe, as well as other parts of the world.
The  insolvency  of  Lehman  Brothers  in  2008  resulted  in  a  crisis  of  confidence  which 
consequently resulted in the reluctance of banks to engage in inter  lending activities.16 In 
October 2008, even fundamentally sound financial institutions were facing serious difficulties 
in  accessing liquidity  and this  resulted  in  a situation  whereby national  governments  were 
compelled to intervene at an unprecedented level.17
As well as the systemic related nature of the Financial Crisis (which constituted a vital reason 
for  the  adoption  of  measures  aimed  at  restoring  confidence  to  the  financial  sector), 
devastating consequences of liquidity risk related issues contributed to the ECOFIN Council’s 
decision to adopt  “Conclusions  committing to take all  necessary measures  to enhance the 
soundness and stability of the banking system in order to restore confidence and the proper 
functioning of the financial sector.”18 
2. State Aids19 as Tools for Addressing the Financial Crisis
Public ownership of enterprises is not a new phenomenon at European level. It has existed 
throughout the course of European Economic History. Almost all European countries have 
used this mode of public intervention at different periods in time. Notwithstanding, it is clear 
that the size of the so called “public sector” was changing with time, and from one country to 
another.
The  public  sector  is  expanding  or  decreasing  for  many  different  reasons,  namely:  the 
development of new technologies or activities where the private sector did not have prior 
interest or activities it  was unable to support - like in the railway industry during the 19th 
century,  or the aviation sector in the 20th  century.  However, there are many other reasons, 
even ideological reasons or more circumstantial reasons, such as sartorial or individual crises, 
that are considered to pose dangerous threats to the national social-economy stability. This 
has been the case for many financial institutions in the past two years20. But apparently, the 
financial sector is very peculiar because its failure would generate consequences for “system 
stability”. Is this really the truth? Is it true in all cases? Our academic research will include a 
focus on these questions.
16 A Petrovic and R Tutsch, „National Rescue Measures in Response to the Current Financial Crisis” ECB Legal 
Working Paper Series No 8/ July 2009 at page 6 http://www.ecb.europa.eu and 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1430489
17 see ibid and also paragraph 2 of section 1 of European Commission, “Communication from the Commission 
— The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the 
current global financial crisis” (2008/C 270/02)
18 see paragraph 3 of section 1;ibid
19For further information on rescues of financial institutions and State aids, see also J. A. Rodríguez-Miguez, 
„Rescue of Financial Institutions: An Overview of European Commission Frameworks and Practice on State 
Aids to Financial Sector in the current Global Crisis“ SSRN Working Paper.
20 It’s clear that this wasn’t the first time...
European Law always  remained obscure on this  issue of public  intervention.  As a  result, 
Article 345 TFEU (ex Article 295 TEC) clearly provides and stipulates that “The Treaties  
shall  in  no  way  prejudice  the  rules  in  Member  States  governing  the  system of  property 
ownership.”21
At  the  same  time,  Article  106.1  TFEU (Article  86.1  TEC)  provides  for  equal  treatment 
between public and private enterprises in Member States where it declares that “1. In the case 
of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States grant special or exclusive 
rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the  
rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to those rules provided for in Article 18 and  
Articles 101 to 109.”
 Since the beginning of  the European integration  process,  both principles  have served as 
parameters for understanding the relationship between public and private economic activities 
in the European Union.
At the same time,  Article  107 TFEU (ex Article  87 TEC) sets  a limit  to Member States 
Economic Policy where it declares that “1. Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any 
aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which 
distorts  or  threatens  to  distort  competition  by  favouring  certain  undertakings  or  the  
production of certain goods shall,  in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be  
incompatible with the internal market.”
A decisive and problematic moment occurred, undoubtedly, when the Commission adopted 
the  Commission  Directive  80/723/EEC of  25  June  1980 on  the  transparency of  financial 
relations between Member States and public undertakings22, the so called the “Transparency 
Directive”.
This Directive compelled Member States to demonstrate their financial links with the public 
sector.
As a means of protesting against such a rule, some Member States went to the European Court 
of Justice claiming its legality – however this was rejected by the Court in its Judgment of 6 
July 1982.23 
I. What Constitutes a State Aid?
a) Bases for Assessment
Article  87(1) EC – “State aid is any aid granted by a Member State or (ii)  through state 
resources in any form whatsoever and which iii) distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain undertakings as far as it affects trade between Member States.”
Article 107(1) TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC): According to this provision State aid is any aid 
granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts 
21 The text relating to this article is exactly the same as that of the Treaty of the Economic European Community 
(1956), where it existed as Article 222.
22  OJ L 195, 29.7.1980, p. 35.
23 French Republic, Italian Republic and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Commission 
of the European Communities. Joint cases 188 to 190/80. European Court Reports 1982 Page 02545.
or threatens  to  distort  competition  by favouring certain  undertakings or the production of 
certain goods is, insofar as it affects trade between Member States.
b) Individual Undertakings in Difficulty
State aid to individual undertakings in difficulties is usually assessed under Article 87 (3)(c) 
of the EC Treaty and the Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring 
firms in difficulty.24 As well as the grant of the Commission’s consent for state aids to be 
utilised as remedies in situations which involve serious threats of instability to the economy of 
member  states  -  pursuant  to  Article  87(3)(b),  a  restrictive  interpretation  of  what  can  be 
considered to be “a serious disturbance of a member state’s economy” is also required under 
Article 87(3)(b).25
c) Impact of the Recent Crisis
In addition, under Article 87(3)(b) of the Treaty,  the Commission may allow State aid  ‘to 
remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State’.26
In the light of the level of  seriousness of the current crisis in the financial markets and its 
possible impact on the overall economy of Member States, the Commission considers that 
Article 87(3)(b) is, in the present circumstances, available as a legal basis for aid measures 
undertaken to address this systemic crisis.27
II. State Aids: Rescue and Restructuring Measures
a) Rescue  Aid,  Guarantees,  Controlled  Winding  Down  of  Financial  Institutions  and 
Provision of Other Forms of Liquidity Assistance.
The Commission has proceeded with “the swiftness that is necessary to ensure legal certainty 
and  to  restore  confidence  in  financial  markets’  in  applying  criteria  relevant  for  the 
compatibility with the Treaty, as well as individual and ad hoc cases of systemic relevance 
pursuant to paragraph 5 of section 1 of the Banking Communication. 
The Commission's desire to facilitate swiftness is demonstrated through its flexible approach 
to procedures as illustrated through its decision and willingness to extend proceedings and to 
temporarily  find  compatible  with  the  Common  Market  several  capital  injections28 Even 
though  such  flexibility  can  be  criticised  as  not  facilitating  a  very  high  degree  of  legal 
certainty, a rigid and very restrictive approach to the application of procedures would have 
impeded the swiftness in facilitating a restoration of confidence to the financial markers.
The  impact  of  the  recent  crisis  on  the  choice  of  legislation  reflects  the  Commission's 
eagerness to facilitate a speedy restoration of confidence to financial markets.  Initially, the 
rescue decision had concluded that it was not considered necessary to assess whether Article 
24 OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p.2 (hereinafter R and R guidelines). Such guidelines “articulate the Commission’s 
understanding of Article 87(3) (c) of the Treaty for this type of aid.” See ibid; paragraph 6
25 see ibid at paragraphs 7 - 8
26See Paragraph 7 of the Banking Communication.
27Paragraph 9 of the Banking Communication
28See European Commission, „State aids n° C 15/2009 (ex N 196/2009), N 333/2009 & N 557/2009 - Germany 
Hypo Real Estate – Extension of formal investigation procedure, and temporary find capital injections 
compatible“
107(3) (b) TFEU would apply since the rescue measures had been found compatible on the 
basis of Article 87(3)(c) EC and in particular, the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines.29
Against the background of the recent global financial crisis (whereby it was widely accepted 
that “a serious disturbance in the economy of Member States had occurred and that measures 
supporting banks are appropriate to remedy this disturbance”)30 and taking into account the 
objective of the proposed aid measures, namely, the facilitation of Rumpco's wind-down, it 
was held that the legal basis for the assessment of these measures should be Article 107(3)(b) 
TFEU. Whereas State aid to individual undertakings in difficulties is usually assessed under 
Article 87 (3)(c) of the EC Treaty and the Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing 
and restructuring firms in difficulty, the systemic relevance of a financial institution and the 
impact of such an institution's failure on the economy, was reflected by the preference for 
Article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty and Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.31 -  which were available as legal 
bases for aid measures undertaken to address the systemic crisis.
The legal certainty demonstrated in applying Articles 107 (1) TFEU (ex Article 87(1) EC) and 
Article  87(1)  EC, in  determining  what  constituting  State  aid  will  be  illustrated  by  cases 
relating to Bradford and Bingley and Hypo Real Estate.
b) Guarantees Covering the Liabilities of Financial Institutions
The general principles underlying the State aid rules of the Treaty, which require that the aid 
granted does not exceed what is strictly necessary to achieve its legitimate purpose and that 
distortions of competition are avoided or minimized as far as possible, and taking due account 
of the current circumstances, as well as the observance of these stated criteria 32 translate into 
the following considerations as regards guarantee schemes protecting liabilities established by 
way  of  a  declaration,  legislation  or  contractual  regime,  it  being  understood  that  these 
considerations are of a general nature and need to be adapted to the particular circumstances 
of every individual case.33
Emergency guarantees34 constitute  the first  identified systemic  measure in response to the 
recent  financial  crisis  whilst  the  re  capitalisation35 of  financial  institutions  constitute  the 
“second systemic  measure in  response to  the recent  financial  crisis  to  be used to support 
29 See European Commission, “State aid N 194/2009 –United Kingdom: Liquidation Aid to Bradford and 
Bingley Plc section 4 paragraph 44
30 “This having been confirmed in various Commission communications such as the Communication on the  
application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current  
global financial crisis(hereinafter "the Banking Communication"), its Communication on the re capitalisation of  
financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards  
against  undue  distortions  of  competition (hereinafter  "the  Re  capitalisation  Communication"),  and  its  
Communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in 
the current crisis under the State aid rules (hereinafter "the Restructuring Communication").”
31 Under which the Commission may allow State aid ‘to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a 
Member State.’
32 Stated criteria in paragraph 15 of the Banking Communication (in compliance with the State aid rules 
and the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty, including the principle of non-discrimination)
33 See Section 3 Paragraph (17) of the Banking Communication
34 Guarantees Covering the Liabilities of Financial Institutions granted either under a national scheme or on an 
ad hoc basis, with the requirements of Article 107 (3) (b) TFEU; see section 3 paragraph 17;ibid
35 see section 4 paragraph 34;ibid. The re capitalisation of financial institutions is also considered 
comprehensively in the Communication from the Commission — The re capitalisation of financial institutions 
in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue 
distortions of competition  (2009/C 10/03)
financial institutions that are fundamentally sound but which may experience distress because 
of  extreme  conditions  in  financial  markets.”36 Other  measures  which  may  serve  as 
supplements to rescue aids include the controlled winding up37 of financial institutions and the 
provision of other forms of liquidity assistance.38
Government guarantees, along with the monetary actions of central banks which are aimed at 
lowering interest rates as well as providing banks with exceptional amounts of liquidity, have 
served as means of addressing general liquidity needs of banks.39
The Law on the implementation of a “package of measures to stabilise the financial market”40 
– which came into effect on the 18 October 2008, and the Order implementing the Law on the 
financial  market stabilisation fund,41 constitute the basis of the German scheme. Measures 
included within the scheme comprise guarantees,  re capitalisation ,  the acquisition of risk 
positions, and nationalisation.42
Eligible  institutions  which fall  within the scope of the scheme comprise  solvent  financial 
sector  entities  which  have  their  registered  office  in  Germany,  namely:  (i)  institutions 
established  under  the  Law  on  banking;  (ii)  insurance  corporations  and  pension  funds 
established  under  the  Law  on  insurance  supervision;  (iii)  asset  management  companies 
pursuant to the Law on investment;  and (iv) operators of stock exchanges and derivatives 
exchanges.43
36See Banking Communication Section 4 paragraph 34 of the  “Communication from the Commission — The 
application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current 
global financial crisis” (2008/C 270/02) at page 5
37“Such a controlled liquidation, possibly carried out in conjunction with a contribution of public funds, may be 
applied in individual cases, either as a second step, after rescue aid to an individual financial institution when it 
becomes clear that the latter cannot be restructured successfully, or in one single action. Controlled winding-up 
may also constitute an element of a general guarantee scheme, e.g. where a Member State undertakes to initiate 
liquidation of the financial institutions for which the guarantee needs to be activated.”
See section 5; paragraph 43 of “Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid 
rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis” 
(2008/C 270/02).
38 “Complementary forms of liquidity support - with the provision of public funds (including funds from the 
central bank)”, may be implemented by Member States as accompaniments to guarantees or re capitalisation 
schemes, in addressing very serious liquidity problems encountered by financial institutions. See paragraph 
51;ibid.
39 See DG Competition Staff Working Document, „The Application of State Aid Rules to Government Guarantee 
Schemes Covering Bank Debt to be issued after 30 June 2010” April2010 at page 2
40 Gesetz zur Umsetzung eines Maßnahmenpakets zur Stabilisierung des Finanzmarktes, (2008) 
Bundesgesetzblatt I, p. 1982. Article 1 of the law is the Law on the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund 
(Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz). ; see A Petrovic and R Tutsch, „National Rescue Measures in 
Response to the Current Financial Crisis” ECB Legal Working Paper Series No 8/ July 2009 at page 35 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu and http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1430489
41 Verordnung zur Durchführung des Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetzes, (2008), eBAnz. AT123 V1;which 
came into force a day after; see ibid
42 “The German rescue package was approved by the Commission in its Decision of 27 October 2008 in Case No N 
512/08 Support measures for financial institutions in Germany (OJ C 293, 15.11.2008, p. 2).”; ibid
43 see A Petrovic and R Tutsch, „National Rescue Measures in Response to the Current Financial Crisis” 
ECB Legal Working Paper Series No 8/ July 2009 at page 35
On the 2nd of October 200844, a rescue aid package was granted by the Commission to Hypo 
Real  Estate  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  HRE).45 Formal  investigation  procedures  were 
instigated by the Commission – in relation to HRE on the 7th May 2009.46 Further measures 
were also communicated by the German authorities  on the 26th October  200947 and these 
included SOFFin guarantees of 8 billion Euros for HRE and SOFFin guarantees of 10 billion 
Euros for HRE.48 On the 13th November 2009, the formal investigation procedures of 7th May 
were extended by the Commission (with the inclusion of the stated guarantees of 8 and 10 
billion Euros) – along with the temporary grant of several capital injections.49
III. Hypo Real Estate50
(a) Rescue Aid : Facts of the Case 
The events culminating in the grant of rescue aid to Hypo Real Estate (hereinafter referred to 
as HRA) can be summed up as follows: HRA acquired Depta (Deutsch Pfandbrief bank AG) 
in  2007.  Depfa’s  business  which  was  characterised  by  low  risk  premiums  resulted  in 
principally long term credits being refinanced using short or medium term credit lines – a 
process known as “term transformation.”51 The rescue measure was triggered as a result of the 
expiration period of a large par t of Depfa’s short term refinancing measures – which was fast 
approaching and which was in need of renewal.52 Depfa’s inability to obtain refinancing at 
short notice because of the collapse of the interbank’s market – such collapse being attributed 
to  the  year  long  financial  crisis  (particularly  events  which  occurred  in  the  aftermath  of 
September 2008 – including the collapse of Lehman Brothers) meant that HRE had to secure 
financing for Depta’s short term liquidity needs.53
b) Consequences of Hypo Real Estate’s Insolvency
 Three  consequences  emanating  in  the  event  of  HRE’s  insolvency,  as  identified  are  as 
follows:54
44 Commission decision of 2.10.2008, OJ C 293, 15.11.2008, p. 1
45 European Commission, “European Commission  State aid n° N 694/2009 – Germany Emergency 
guarantees for Hypo Real Estate” paragraph 1 at page 1
46 See Commission decision of 7 May 2009, replaced by decision of 24 July 2009 in case C 15/2009 (ex N 
196/2009), OJ C 240, 7.10.2009, p. 11) and ibid paragraph 2
47 Case number: N 557/2009
48 European Commission, “European Commission  State aid n° N 694/2009 – Germany Emergency 
guarantees for Hypo Real Estate” paragraph 3
49 see ibid paragraph 4 and Decision C(2009) 8967 final)
50See European Commission, „“State aid NN 44/2008 – Germany Rescue Aid for Hypo Real Estate” at page 2 
of 9 <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ii/doc/NN-44-2008-WLWL-en-02.10.2008.pdf>
51 see ibid paragraph 5 of section 2.2 
52 paragraph 6; ibid 
53 ibid; However, the amount of the credit line to be repaid on 30 September was too large for HRE.
“From 26 to  29 September  intensive  consultations  took place  at  the  Federal  Financial  Supervisory 
Authority (hereinafter "BaFin") between representatives of HRE, private banks, the Federal Bank and BaFin. 
The aim of these discussions was to find a solution for HRE's liquidity problems which had arisen at short 
notice. The starting point was that a credit line of €35 billion is necessary in order to ensure HRE's liquidity in 
the medium term. A liquidity forecast was used to justify this to the Commission. In the night from 28 to 29 
September, the German Federal Bank and BaFin announced that the German financial sector and the Federal 
Bank would grant HRE a credit line of €35 billion. The Federal Bank and BaFin assume that HRE's commercial 
viability is ensured. Thus, the systemic reduction of HRE´s risk positions should be enabled and damage to the 
German and European financial markets should be avoided.” See paragraphs 7-8;ibid.
54 See paragraph 18 at page 5 of 9; ibid
- Firstly, it would lead to very serious disturbances in the money markets in Germany 
and in the European Union.
- Secondly, there is a danger of serious distortions of payment transactions, for example 
in the case of transactions involving foreign exchange, securities or derivatives.
- Thirdly, it would damage the covered bond market, which plays an important role in 
refinancing the banks, particularly at this time of crisis. “55
c) SOFFin Guarantees
What Constitutes State Aid? (Article 107 (1) TFEU): Evaluation of 8 and 10 billion 
Euros worth of SOFFin Guarantees.
In  assessing  what  constitutes  the  existence  of  State  aid  under  Article  107(1)  TFEU,  the 
Commission arrived at the preliminary conclusion that “all measures granted till May 2009 
were  to  constitute  State  aid  within  the  meaning  of  Article  107(1)  TFEU.”56 Further,  the 
Commission considered the 8 and 10 billion worth of SOFFin guarantees to HRE to be State 
aid – in accordance with the conclusion in respect of guarantees addressed in the opening 
decision and the preliminary decision of the extension decision.57 It regarded the guarantees as 
State aid since HRE would not have received them in the private market under the present 
conditions.58 
Furthermore,  the Commission justified its decision to consider the guarantees as State aid 
since:59
i) It considered it evident that the guarantees were from State resources
ii) They had been offered to one bank only; and that
iii) Because  HRE  is  active  in  the  banking  sector  (which  is  characterised  by 
competition across member states), these measures distort competition and affect 
inter State trade.
(d) Compatibility of aid with the Internal market: The requirement of a Condition 
aimed at remedying “a serious disturbance in the economy of a member state.”(Article 
107(3)(b) TFEU.
In line with the general principles which constitute the basis of State aid rules of the Treaty, 
which require that the aid granted “does not exceed what is strictly necessary to achieve its 
legitimate  purpose and that distortions of competition are avoided or minimized as far  as 
55 “At around €900 billion, the German covered bond market is the second largest in the world. HRE represents 
around one fifth of this market. Covered bonds are a popular form of investment abroad, including in the USA, 
and confidence in them is high. Germany considers that the consequences of an uncontrolled collapse would be 
inestimable for the many creditors of HRE, with many banks being involved. Germany also states that pension 
schemes, professional associations, Bundesländer and municipalities had, in some cases, invested hundreds of 
millions in the Munich-based institute.” ibid
56 European Commission, “European Commission  State aid n° N 694/2009 – Germany Emergency guarantees 
for Hypo Real Estate” at page 3 (section 4.1 paragraph 18)
57 ibid at paragraph 19
58 ibid
59 ibid
possible, and taking due account of the current circumstances, all general support measures 
are require to be”:60
- well targeted in order to be able to achieve effectively the objective of remedying a 
serious disturbance in the economy;
- proportionate to the challenge faced, not going beyond what is required to attain this 
effect; and
- designed in such a way as to minimize negative spill over effects on competitors, other 
sectors and other member states.”
Article 107 (3) (b) TFEU allows the Commission to find aid compatible with the internal 
market if it serves “ to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State".61 
The Commission justified its assessment of State aid measures in the banking sectors at the 
time, in view of the current fragile state of the financial markets and with regards to the fact 
that the collapse and failure of a systemically relevant bank can directly affect the financial 
markets and indirectly the entire economy of a Member State.62 Furthermore, the supervisory 
authority, BaFin, indicated that “a collapse of HRE group would have considerable negative 
effects on the national and international financial markets, with the potential to cause major 
disruptions and to eliminate the trust that has recently resurged.”63 The Commission, on these 
bases, assessed the State aid measures for HRE under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.
(e) Are Guarantees Appropriate, Necessary and Proportional?
In arriving at the conclusion that the guarantees were appropriate, necessary and proportional 
at the time, and in considering their compatibility with the Internal Market on the basis of 
Article  107(3)(b)TFEU  on  a  temporary  basis,  the  Commission  based  its  decision  on  the 
following considerations:64
i) That from the information provided by Germany, it was evident that HRE was still 
experiencing  serious  difficulties  in  covering  its  refinancing  needs  without 
continued State support, and therefore State guarantees on its funding operations 
are  an  appropriate  means  and  necessary  to  ensure  that  it  can  maintain  its 
operations.
ii)  In cases where financial stability is at stake and urgent remedial action is needed 
to keep the ailing bank afloat - as in the present case -, it can be accepted that it is 
necessary to temporarily grant emergency aid prior to the final assessment of the 
revised restructuring plan.
iii) The  guarantee  amounting  to  EUR 8 billion  is  proportionate  as  it  is  limited  in 
amount and time.
iv) The guarantee amounting to EUR 10 billion is proportionate as it is limited in time 
and amount.
60 See section 3 paragraph 15 of the Banking Communication
61 European Commission, “European Commission  State aid n° N 694/2009 – Germany Emergency guarantees 
for Hypo Real Estate” at page 4 section 4.2.1 paragraph 21
62 ibid
63 ibid at paragraph 22
64 see ibid at paragraphs 24-27
(f) Decision in Respect of Guarantees and Rescue Aid
The Commission decided to temporarily find compatible with the internal market the SoFFin 
guarantee  of  EUR 8  billion  in  favour  of  HRE.65 In  respect  of  the  10  billion  Euros, the 
Commission also decided to temporarily find compatible with the internal market the granting 
of a SoFFin guarantee of EUR 10 billion in favour of HRE granted before 21 June 2010.66 
The Commission’s decision to regard the rescue aid measure for HRE as State aid within the 
meaning of Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty was based on the following considerations:67
i) The fact the provision by the consortium and the Federal Bank of the liquidity 
lines guaranteed through the Federal Government's default guarantee constitutes 
state  resources  benefiting  HRE,  and  thus  distorting  or  threatening  to  distort 
competition, and affecting trade between Member States in which HRE takes part 
as an international bank.
ii) HRE derives  a  selective  advantage  from the  measure.  The Commission  would 
recall that  any intervention financed using public resources that gives a company 
an advantage constitutes state aid under Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, unless an 
investor  acting  under  normal  market  conditions  would  have  also  taken  such a 
measure. The Federal Government's decision to provide the default guarantee in 
question must therefore satisfy the principle of the market-economy investor in 
order to exclude state aid elements.
iii) Without  the  Federal  Government's  above-average  involvement,  no  private 
participation at  all  would have been possible.  For this  reason,  the Commission 
concludes that an investor acting under normal market conditions would at least 
not have granted HRE such a high liquidity line or default guarantee. The measure 
in  question  therefore  constitutes  state  aid,  despite  the  participation  of  private 
parties.  Moreover, the Commission notes that Germany notified the measure as 
state aid, and therefore does not call the classification as such into question.
iv) The granting of the emergency liquidity line amounting to […] by the German 
Federal  Bank  is  an  aid  measure  too  because,  according  to  the  Commission's 
decision-making practice,  it does not satisfy the criteria for central bank liquidity 
lines not constituting aid, as the liquidity line could be granted without eligible 
securities  and  thus  only  on  the  basis  of  the  Federal  Government's  default 
guarantee.68
65 “while the conditions of the guarantee might be reviewed in the Commission's final decision on the 
restructuring plan.” See ibid section 5
66 “But for a duration which will in any case be one year at maximum, while the conditions of the guarantee 
might be reviewed in the Commission's final decision on the restructuring plan.” ibid
67 See European Commission, „“State aid NN 44/2008 – Germany Rescue Aid for Hypo Real Estate” paragraphs 
20 –22 at page 6 of 9 <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/ii/doc/NN-44-2008-WLWL-en-
02.10.2008.pdf>
68  It had to be first be established that the consortium's private participation in the liquidity line for HRE did not 
disqualify the measures from the outset from being state aid. The Federal Government was much more exposed 
than the consortium's banks since it is taking a far greater risk than the institutes belonging to the consortium, 
since it, in contrast to the institutes, is providing and guaranteeing liquidity over and above the mark-to-market 
amount of the collateral. It seems, however, that the entire amount is needed in order to overcome HRE's present 
difficulties. 
See ibid; paragraph 23 at page 7 of 9
In sum, as well as arriving at the decision that: i) Pursuant to Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty, 
that the measure was to be regarded as a state aid; (ii) That the component of the aid measure 
which was implemented in violation of Article 88(3) of the EC Treaty was to be regarded as 
non-notified  state  aid;  the  Commission  also  concluded  that  since  such  a  measure  was 
compatible with the common market – pursuant to Article 87(3)(c), ii) no objections were to 
be raise against it.69
In January 2009, the German government had promulgated necessary procedures aimed at 
facilitating the adoption of legislation which would enable it acquire a majority stake holding 
in  Hypo.70 The squeeze-out  of  minority  shareholders  -  this  being  approved by a  court  in 
Munich in October 2009, paved way for the German government's rescue fund SoFFin to get 
100 percent of the real estate lender.71
“Evidence shows that the use of guarantees has considerably declined since the peak in the 
first half of 2009 in terms of both numbers of issues of guaranteed bank debt and volume of 
issuances.72 The data collected further demonstrates that  the number of banks resorting to 
government guarantees is shrinking and that this group is now essentially made up of banks 
that are: 73
 -  either  already  undergoing  restructuring  following  a  Commission  decision  or  where  a 
restructuring commitment has been made pending a final decision on its exact form or
shape; or
 - that are under no such obligation, but have a relatively low rating of A or below or no
rating.
IV) State aid NN 41/2008 – United Kingdom 
a) Rescue aid to Bradford & Bingley
The rescue aid package for which authorisation was sought by the UK authorities  was to 
comprise  of  i)  The  working capital  facility  and ii)  Guarantee  arrangements  for wholesale 
depositors.74 Bradford  and Bingley,  in  the  UK authorities’  view,  was  regarded  as  having 
satisfied  the  requirements  for  the  grant  of  State  aid  based  on  paragraphs  9-11  of  the 
69 See ibid at page 8 of 9.
70 See Reuters, “Hypo Real Estate’s path to Nationalisation” 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5381WB20090409 >
71 See Reuters, “Hypo Real Estate is Nationalised with Squeeze Out” 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLD67573320091013>. “The Financial Market Stabilisation Authority 
purchased 47.31 % of Hypo Real Estate shares. This was to ensure that at the General Meeting, which would 
take place on 2 June 2009, the Financial Market Stabilisation Authority would have the simple majority of votes 
and thus be able to put through a capital increase. After the capital increase of EUR 3 billion, the Financial 
Market Stabilisation Authority was to subscribe to all new shares, which would give it 90 % of the voting rights. 
This would enable it to take over all shares by means of a squeeze-out. The planned acquisition by the 
Government was granted merger clearance by the Commission on 15 May 2009.”;see Petrovic and R Tutsch, 
„National Rescue Measures in Response to the Current Financial Crisis” ECB Legal Working Paper Series No 8/ 
July 2009 at page 41
72 DG Competition Staff Working Document, „The Application of State Aid Rules to Government 
Guarantee Schemes Covering Bank Debt to be issued after 30 June 2010” April2010 at page 2
73 see ibid at pages 2 and 3
Community Guidelines75 – since it was considered to be a firm in difficulty, and also because 
it satisfied the “one time last time” principle.76 Furthermore, the measures were regarding as 
being compatible with the common market for the purposes remedying “a serious disturbance 
in the economy of the United Kingdom”- pursuant to Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty.77
However, in contrast to the situation with Northern Rock, the effects of the credit crunch were 
considered  to  be  far  from  restricted  to  individual  banks  in  the  UK.78 Given  these 
circumstances and owing to the fact that B&B was (at the time) the third significant mortgage 
lender to be in severe financial difficulties, a “real systemic risk” was considered to be in need 
of redress, and not merely individual difficulties.79
b) Do the Measures Constitute State Aid: Assessment under Article 87(1) EC
As with Hypo Real Estate, the Commission first assessed whether the measures were to be 
regarded as State aid pursuant to Article 87(1) EC – under which “state aid is any aid granted 
by a Member State or (ii)  through state resources in any form whatsoever  and which iii) 
distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings as far as it affects 
trade between Member States.”
Pursuant  to  Article  87(1)  of  the EC Treaty,  the guarantee  arrangements  and the  working 
capital facility were held, by the Commission, to constitute state aid.
In accordance with point 25 (b) of the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines, the aims of the 
measures are as follows: 80
- The  prevention  of  serious  social  difficulties.  Furthermore  such  measures  have  no 
unduly adverse spill-over effects on other Member States. 
- The protection of the jobs of some of the workers of B&B - who in the case of an 
ordinary  liquidation  may  have  lost  their  jobs.  The  protection  of  depositors  hence 
preventing a situation whereby the savings of UK citizens could be endangered. 
- Maintaining confidence in the UK financial system – this being considered to be the 
most important of all the aims. 
In its decision, the Commission held that pursuant to Article 87 (1) EC Treaty, the working 
liquidity facility and guarantee arrangements were to be treated as State aids. Furthermore, it 
held that aids associated with the Transfer Order (even though these were structural by nature) 
74 “The UK authorities accept that the guarantee arrangements and the working capital facility contain State aid 
elements. However, the transfer package being not an aided undertaking for which the transferee paid the best 
price, the UK authorities considers that it does not contain State aid elements.” See European Commission, 
“State aid NN 41/2008 – United Kingdom Rescue Aid to Bradford & Bingley” paragraphs 22 and 26.
75 On State aid for Rescuing and Restructuring firms in difficulty – referred to as „the Rescue and Restructuring 
Guidelines”; ibid
76 “As it had not received any aid in the past 10 years “; ibid
77 ibid at paragraph 27
78 ibid
79 ibid
80 ibid at paragraph 47 and page 9 of 11; “The Commission did not consider it necessary to assess whether 
Article 87(3)(b) EC, which allows aid to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State would 
apply at that stage in time - given that the Commission considers that the measure is compatible on the basis of 
Article 87(3)(c) EC.” See ibid at paragraph 52
could be considered to be urgent rescue aids.  Even though it  was held that a breach had 
occurred and that aid measures constituted non notified State aid, no objections were raised by 
the Commission against these measures since they were also held to be compatible with the 
Common Market as rescue aid.81
3. RECAPITALISATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
I. Re capitalisation Schemes
Guarantee  schemes  could  be  distinguished  from  re  capitalisation  schemes  in  that  re 
capitalisation schemes are generally used in collaboration with financial institutions that are 
“fundamentally sound but which may experience  distress because of extreme conditions in 
financial markets.”82 However, the Re capitalisation Communication also makes provision for 
banks which are not so fundamentally sound.83
The objective being the provision of public funds in order “to consolidate the capital base of 
the financial institutions directly or to facilitate the injection of private capital by other means, 
so as to prevent negative systemic spill- overs.”84
Under  section  2 paragraph 14 of  the Banking Communication,  distortions  of  competition 
resulting from schemes supporting the viability of institutions which are illiquid but otherwise 
fundamentally sound, will normally be more limited and require less substantial restructuring 
than  those  financial  institutions  which  are  particularly  affected  by  losses  stemming  for 
instance from inefficiencies, poor asset-liability management or risky strategies. In the paper 
preceding this,85 the justification for the grant of State aid to institutions whose losses result 
from  inefficiencies,  poor  asset-liability  management  or  risky  strategies  was  considered. 
Furthermore, the grant of State aid to such institutions was justified on the basis that systemic 
relevant institutions within this category86, whose failure pose such disastrous consequences 
for financial stability, should not be allowed to fail. 
81See ibid at paragraphs 54 -56
82 Re capitalisation schemes constitute a “second systemic measure in response to the recent financial crisis to be 
used to support financial institutions that are fundamentally sound but which may experience distress because of 
extreme  conditions  in  financial  markets.”  See  Banking  Communication  Section  4  paragraph  34  of  the 
“Communication from the Commission — The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to 
financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis” (2008/C 270/02) at page 5
83See Section 2.3 paragraph 43 of the  Communication from the Commission  — The re capitalisation of financial 
institutions in the  current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue 
distortions of competition - which states that the re capitalisation of banks which are not fundamentally sound 
should be subject to stricter requirements. Furthermore, paragraph 44 states that 
“As far as remuneration is concerned, it should in principle reflect the risk profile of the beneficiary and be 
higher than for fundamentally sound banks. This is without prejudice to the possibility for supervisory authorities to 
take urgent action where necessary in cases of restructuring.”
84 See section 4 paragraph 34 of the Banking Communication
85M Ojo, “Liquidity Assistance and the Provision of State Aid to Financial Institutions” (2010) Munich RePEc 
and SSRN Working Papers
86 Category of institutions whose losses result from inefficiencies, poor asset-liability management or risky 
strategies.
With respect to purposes which the re capitalisation of banks could serve, three common 
objectives are listed in the Commission’s Communication 87 and these are as follows:
i) Contribution to the restoration of financial stability as well as the restoration of the 
confidence needed for the recovery of inter-bank lending. Further, additional capital 
serves as a cushion during periods of recession by absorbing losses and reducing the 
likelihood and risk of banks becoming insolvent.88
ii) Facilitating lending to the real economy89
iii) State  re  capitalisation  could also serve to  address  and rectify insolvency problems 
faced  by  financial  institutions  –  such  problems  having  arisen  as  a  result  of  such 
institutions’ particular business model or investment strategy.90
In respect of this third objective (for which the re capitalisation of banks could serve), it is 
interesting  to note  that  Paragraph 6 of the Re capitalisation  Communication,  provides for 
“problems of financial institutions facing insolvency as a result of their particular business 
model or investment strategy“ - given the fact that paragraphs 4 and 5 explicitly provide for 
fundamentally sound financial institutions. Whilst paragraph 4 interalia states that „additional 
capital provides a cushion during periods of recession, to absorb losses and limits the risk of 
banks  becoming  insolvent“,  paragraph  5  recognises  that  fundamentally  sound banks  may 
prefer to restrict lending in order to avoid risk and maintain higher capital ratios.
According to paragraph 6 of the Re capitalisation Communication, „a capital injection from 
public sources providing emergency support to an individual bank may also help to avoid 
short term systemic effects of its possible insolvency.  In the longer term, re capitalisation 
could support efforts to prepare the return of the bank in question to long term viability or its 
orderly winding-up.“ Against the back drop of this exceptional provision, a case relating to 
the grant  of  capital  injections  for  a non fundamentally  sound financial  institution  will  be 
considered.
II. Hypo Real Estate (HRE) – Capital Injections
„In April 2010, the German Financial Markets Stabilisation Fund (SoFFin) approved the next 
re capitalisation tranches of up to €1.85 billion for Hypo Real Estate Holding AG (HRE), 
within the framework of the existing capital plan. It is planned that this capital be paid into 
87 See paragraph 4 of the Communication from the Commission — The re capitalisation of financial institutions in 
the  current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of 
competition
88 ibid
89 “Fundamentally sound banks may prefer to restrict lending in order to avoid risk and maintain higher capital 
ratios. State capital injection may prevent credit supply restrictions and limit the pass-on of the financial markets' 
difficulties  to  other  businesses.”  see  ibid  at  paragraph  5.  Further,  according  to  paragraph  39  of  the  Re 
capitalisation Communication, “When Member States use re capitalisation with the objective of financing the real 
economy, they have to ensure that the aid effectively contributes to this. To that end, in accordance with national 
regulation, they should attach effective and enforceable national safeguards to re capitalisation which ensure that the 
injected capital is used to sustain lending to the real economy.” 
90 Furthermore re capitalisation may also respectively serve to address short term and long term systemic effects 
through  capital  injections  from  public  sources  providing  emergency  support  to  an  individual  bank  and 
“supporting efforts to prepare the return of the bank in question to long term viability or its orderly winding-up.“ 
see ibid at paragraph 6
HRE's capital reserve in at least two tranches as necessary. In particular, the re capitalisation 
is necessary in order for DEPFA BANK plc to maintain its minimum regulatory capital ratios 
in the near future. The capital measure is subject to approval by the European Commission. 
Including the support measure at hand, SoFFin has to date, provided total re capitalisation 
support of around € 7.85 billion to the HRE Group.“91
Having regards to i) Article 87(3)(b) EC Treaty which enables the Commission to declare aid 
compatible with the Common Market if it is "to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy 
of a Member State"; the fact that ii) Germany considered HRE to be a bank with systemic 
relevance  for the financial  market,  iii)  BaFin confirmed that  the own capital  of the bank 
would fall short of the regulatory requirements if the bank did not receive further capital and 
iv) that bank supervisory procedures would be initiated if the bank did not receive further 
capital, the Commission assessed the State aid measures for HRE under Article 87(3)(b) of 
the EC Treaty.92
„The Commission decided to assess the temporary compatibility of capital measures until a 
decision  on  the  restructuring  plan  was  taken  -  since  Germany  had  asked  for  temporary 
approval of the capital measures. If the measures were held to be compatible the Commission 
decided  it  would  not  consider  whether  the  measures  were  already  compatible  under  the 
German rescue aid scheme.“93
Even though HRE was in the process of restructuring at the time, and Germany had already 
provided a restructuring plan which was subsequently updated and was being assessed by the 
Commission  at  the  time,  the  need  to  temporarily  grant  emergency  aid  prior  to  the  final 
assessment of the revised restructuring plan was acknowledged since financial stability was at 
stake in the prevailing case and urgent remedial action was required to keep the ailing bank 
afloat – this also being confirmed by the national financial supervisory authority.94
The  Commission  temporarily  found  compatible  with  the  Common  Market,  the  capital 
injection amounting  to  EUR 60 million  carried out in March 200995,  the capital  injection 
91See  „SoFFin  passes  resolution  on  €  1.85  billion  re  capitalisation  for  HRE“  30  April  2010 
<http://www.hyporealestate.com/eng/pdf/1004recaptranch_e.pdf> „In  2007,  HRE took over  the Dublin-based 
DEPFA Bank plc and extended its business to public sector and infrastructure finance. HRE currently consists of 
the following main companies: Hypo Real Estate Holding AG, Deutsche Pfandbriefbank AG and DEPFA Bank 
plc.“ see European Commission, „State Aids n° C 15/2009 (ex N 196/2009),  N 333/2009 & N 557/2009 – 
Germany  Hypo  Real  Estate  –  Extension  of  Formal  Investigation  Procedure,  and  Temporary  Find  Capital 
Injections Compatible“ at paragraphs 12 and 13
92See European Commission, „State Aids n° C 15/2009 (ex N 196/2009), N 333/2009 & N 557/2009 – Germany 
Hypo  Real  Estate  –  Extension  of  Formal  Investigation  Procedure,  and  Temporary  Find  Capital  Injections 
Compatible“ paragraphs 41 and 42, at pages 6 and 7; „The Commission re iterated is doubts on the viability of 
HRE in its decision (Decision C(2009) 5888 final) of 24 July 2009 and the present case, taking into account the 
more detailed figures in the updated restructuring plan and questioning whether the intended restructuring was 
sufficient to allow restoration of long-term viability on the basis of the State aid received and planned.
The Commission also identified three problematic aspects that could affect the long-term sustainability 
of HRE's business model – which it intended to investigate further. The three problematic aspects included :i) 
Funding, ii)Short- and long-term profitability and (iii)the fact that HRE indicated in its revised business plan that 
it  wanted  to  remain  active  in  two  fields:  Commercial  Real  Estate  and  Public  Finance.  Nevertheless,  the 
Commission observed at the time that the intended margin in the area of public finance was very low and that 
market pressure could further reduce achievable margins.“ See paragraphs 58 -61;ibid
93See ibid at paragraph 44
94Ibid at paragraph 48
95„With regard to its silent participation of EUR 1 billion, SoFFin was to receive a profit-related coupon of 10 %. 
This  level  of  remuneration  was  considered  to  be   in  line  with  paragraph  44  of  the  Re  capitalisation 
Communication, which stipulates that where the price cannot be set to levels that correspond to the risk profile of 
the  bank,  it  would nevertheless  need  to  be  close  to  that  required  for  a  similar  bank  under  normal  market 
amounting  to  EUR  2  959  632  240  carried  out  in  June  2009,  and  the  capital  injection 
amounting to EUR 3.0 billion to be carried out in November 2009 in favour of HRE until the 
Commission  has  taken  a  final  decision  on  the  restructuring  plan.96 Furthermore the 
Commission  concluded  that  the  capital  injections  „are  appropriate,  necessary  and 
proportional,  and can be considered compatible with the Common Market on a temporary 
basis until a final decision was taken on the restructuring plan of HRE.“97
Such a decision to accord priority to financial stability will be contrasted to other scenarios 
which give more preference to the need to minimise and avoid distortions of competition in 
the next section.
III. Minimising and Avoiding Distortions of Competition
i) Safeguards  Against  Possible  Distortions  of  Competition  in  Re  capitalisation 
Schemes.98
As well as highlighting the Banking Communication's emphasis on the need for safeguards 
aimed  at  preventing  and  limiting  possible  distortions  of  competition  in  re  capitalisation 
schemes,99 paragraph 35 of the Re capitalisation Communication also makes mention of the 
Banking Communication's requirement100 that capital injections be limited to the minimum 
necessary and not  to  allow the beneficiary to  engage in  aggressive commercial  strategies 
which  would  be  incompatible  with  the  underlying  objectives  of  re  capitalisation.  Where 
higher remuneration is required by the State, there will (as a general principle) be less need 
for safeguards - since the level of price, in the Commission’s view, will limit distortions of 
competition.101 
However this can be contrasted with the case involving Hypo Real Estate where in respect of 
the capital injections carried out by acquiring share capital and the injection into the reserves, 
the  German  authorities  highlighted  that  SoFFin  as  100% HRE owner,  was  entitled  to  a 
shareholder's usual remuneration. Furthermore, it was stated that „for a distressed bank, no 
market-conform remuneration can be expected, at least in the short-term, for such provision of 
conditions. Moreover, the Commission highlighted the fact that HRE would not get capital at an economically 
justifiable remuneration level on the market in the current circumstances but that given the fact that HRE was in 
difficulty, it should pay at least a reasonable price - that 10 % was considered to be an acceptable level.“ (See 
Commission decision of 12 May 2009 in case N 615/2008, BayernLB); see paragraph 52; ibid.
96See ibid; section 5 at page 11; „The capital injection of EUR 60 million had only limited scope, resulting in a 
8.65% share of HRE's equity capital which did not give Germany a major influence on the bank“; see paragraph 
49
97Ibid at paragraph 54 
98In the Commission's view, „Safeguards may be necessary to prevent aggressive commercial expansion financed by 
State aid. In principle,  mergers and acquisitions can constitute a valuable contribution to the consolidation of the 
banking industry with a view to achieving the objectives of stabilising financial markets and ensuring a steady flow of 
credit  to  the  real  economy.  In  order  not  to  privilege  those  institutions  with  public  support  to  the  detriment  of 
competitors  without  such  support,  mergers  and  acquisitions  should  generally  be  organised  on  the  basis  of  a 
competitive tendering process.” see paragraph 37 of the Re capitalisation Communication.
99Paragraph 35 of the Banking Communication
100Paragraph 38 of the Banking Communication
101„Banks receiving State re capitalisation should also avoid advertising it for commercial purposes.” See paragraph 36 
of the Re capitalisation Communication. (Communication from the Commission — The re capitalisation of financial 
institutions in the  current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue 
distortions of competition )
capital and that in line with the Re capitalisation Communication, such a situation required a 
thorough and far-reaching restructuring.“102
Safeguards which have been proposed as means of preventing distortions of competition with 
guarantee schemes include restrictions on commercial conducts through for example market 
share ceilings, limitations to the size of the balance-sheet of the beneficiary institutions or 
other behavioural constraints that may be needed to achieve the purpose of the guarantee.103 
Issues which are also considered to arise with these safeguards include:104
- How  they  can  be  properly  monitored  and  enforced  since  financial  services  are 
typically not regarded as standardized products.
- The likelihood that some restrictions such as those on the growth of undertaking may 
themselves generate anticompetitive effects in terms of collusive agreements.
- Of paramount importance is the concern related to the remuneration of the guarantee 
scheme or any other form of intervention such as the re capitalization schemes. 105
ii) Prevention and Limitation of Undue Distortions of Competition
Three  levels  of  possible  distortions  of  competition  are  highlighted  in  the  Commission 
Communication106 on the Re capitalisation of Financial Institutions and these are as follows:107
• First, re capitalisation by one Member State of its own banks should not give those 
banks an undue competitive advantage over banks in other Member States. Access to 
capital at considerably lower rates than competitors from other Member States, in the 
absence of an appropriate risk-based justification, may have a substantial impact on 
the competitive position of a bank in the wider single European market.108
102See paragraph 53 of European Commission, „State Aids n° C 15/2009 (ex N 196/2009), N 333/2009 & N 
557/2009 – Germany Hypo Real Estate – Extension of Formal Investigation Procedure, and Temporary Find 
Capital Injections Compatible“
103Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development,  “Competition  and  the  Financial  Crisis” 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Publications February 2009 at page 15.Paper served  
as the basis for a discussion on the financial crisis in the OECD Competition Committee on 17-18 February 
2009  and   is  published  under  the  responsibility  of  the  Secretary  General  of  the  OECD.  
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/24/42538399.pdf>
104ibid
105„In principle, the remuneration of any type of support such as the issuance of new shares or asset swaps 
should be determined on the basis of a market-oriented valuation and be as close as possible to the market rate. 
However, at the current moment, the pricing mechanism in the markets seems to have stopped working properly. 
In  such a situation, an important question is how to explicitly calculate an appropriate remuneration for the 
public supports in a time when markets are so highly illiquid and volatile that market prices may no longer be 
tied to the value of fundamentals. This issue resembles the current de”bate in the application of mark-to-market 
accounting standards when markets do not work properly.” ibid
106 See  paragraphs  7-10 of  the  Communication  from the  Commission – „The re  capitalisation  of  Financial 
Institutions in the  Current Financial Crisis: Limitation of aid to the Minimum Necessary and Safeguards Against 
Undue Distortions of Competition
107See paragraphs 8 -10; ibid
108„ Excessive aid in one Member State could also prompt a subsidy race among Member States and create difficulties 
for the economies of Member States which have not introduced re capitalisation schemes. A coherent and coordinated 
approach to the remuneration of public capital injections, and to the other conditions attached to re capitalisation, is 
indispensable to the preservation of a level playing field. Unilateral and uncoordinated action in this area may also 
undermine efforts to restore financial stability (‘Ensuring fair competition between Member States’).”
• Secondly, re capitalisation schemes which are open to all banks within a Member State 
without an appropriate degree of differentiation between beneficiary banks according 
to their  risk profiles may give an undue advantage to distressed or less-performing 
banks compared to banks which are fundamentally sound and better-performing.109
• Thirdly,  public re capitalisation,  in particular its remuneration,  should not have the 
effect of putting banks that do not have recourse to public funding, but seek additional 
capital on the market, in a significantly less competitive position.110
In considering whether State aid (and in particular emergency guarantees) was to be granted 
to Hypo Real Estate, the Commission in attempting to ensure that distortions of competition 
were minimised (as far as possible), considered  the Requirement that aid granted “does not 
exceed what  is  strictly  necessary to achieve  its  legitimate  purpose and that  distortions  of 
competition are avoided or minimized as far as possible” - in line with the general principles 
which constitute the basis of State aid rules of the Treaty, which require that the aid granted 
“does  not  exceed  what  is  strictly  necessary  to  achieve  its  legitimate  purpose  and  that 
distortions of competition are avoided or minimized as far as possible.”111
iii) Exit Strategies to Address Distortions to Competition Instituted by Crisis Responses 
According  to  the  Re  capitalisation  Communication,  „re  capitalisation  measures  need  to 
contain appropriate incentives for State capital to be redeemed when the market so allows. 
The  simplest  way to  provide  an incentive  for  banks  to  look for  alternative  capital  is  for 
Member States to require an adequately high remuneration for the State re capitalisation.“112
Furthermore, the Communication states that „if a Member State prefers not to increase the 
nominal rate of remuneration, it may consider increasing the global remuneration through call 
options or other redemption clauses, or mechanisms that encourage private capital raising, for 
instance by linking the payment of dividends to an obligatory remuneration of the State which 
increases over time.“113
In facilitating exit strategies, „member States may also consider using a restrictive dividend 
policy to ensure the temporary character of State intervention.“114
The OECD's proposal is founded on the distinction between the types of aid provided for i) 
financial firms for systemic reasons and ii) for non-financial firms with structural problems. 
As pre requisite for the grant of aid to non financial firms, the requirement that “ structural 
reforms to a sustainable industry structure” exist, was put forward.115
109„ This will  distort competition on the market,  distort incentives,  increase moral hazard and weaken the overall 
competitiveness of European banks (‘Ensuring fair competition between banks’).”
110“A public scheme which crowds out market-based operations will frustrate the return to normal market functioning 
(‘Ensuring a return to normal market functioning’).”
111European Commission, “European Commission  State aid n° N 694/2009 – Germany Emergency guarantees 
for Hypo Real Estate” 
112See paragraph 31 of the Re capitalisation Communication.
113See paragraph 32 of the Re capitalisation Communication.
114See ibid
115See Organisation for Economic Co operation Development, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” at page 22
Furthermore, “the need to ensure that structural reforms promote the long-term viability of 
these  firms”  is  considered  to  constitute  part  of  an  exit  strategy.116 Other  forms  of  aid 
considered include:117
• nationalization of financial institutions or non-financial firms;
• state-sponsored capital injections118 
• extended liquidity facilities;
• inter bank lending guarantees; and
• state acquisition of so-called “toxic assets”.
According  to  Schäfer  and  Zimmermann,  five  ways  through  which  ailing  banks  could 
efficiently be relieved of their assets – through their conversion , by the government, to „bad 
banks“ include:119
• Troubled assets should be valued based on current market prices prior to their takeover 
by the bad bank. Troubled assets for which there is no market should be transferred to 
the bad bank at a „zero price“ and therefore at zero cost for the government as the bad 
bank’s sponsor. 120
• The government should re capitalise the rescued component of the bank through the 
acquisition of a shareholder stake; in extreme cases, the rescued component should be 
taken over by the government. 121
• The „bad bank“  should  be  funded by the  government.  External  experts  should  be 
entrusted  with  the  management  and  future  sale  of  the  troubled  assets  at  the 
government’s expense. If a profit remains after the proceeds from holding the troubled 
assets until expiration date or selling those assets to the market have materialised and 
operating costs have been deducted, these profits should be distributed to the former 
shareholders. 
• The government should announce its commitment to the future re-privatisation of its 
stake in the rescued bank. When establishing a bad bank, the government should make 
116ibid
117ibid
118„In the European Union, relevant competition decisions have included Commission Decision of 13 October 
2008 in Case N 507/08 Financial Support Measures to the banking Industry in the UK (OJ C 290, 13.11.2008, p. 
4), Commission Decision of 27 October 2008 in Case N 512/08 Support measures for financial institutions in  
Germany  (OJ C 293, 15.11.2008, p. 2) and Commission Decision of 19 November 2008 in Case N 560/08 
Support measures for the credit institutions in Greece, Commission Decision of 12 November 2008 in Case N 
528/08 the Netherlands, Aid to ING Groep N.V., Commission Decision of 25 November 2008 in Case NN 68/08 
on Latvian State support to JSC Parex Banka. Commission Communication of 13 October on The application of 
State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial 
crisis  (OJ  C  270,  25.10.2008,  p.8)  and  European  Commission  principles  are  outlined  in  Commission 
Communication of 5 December on The re capitalization of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: 
limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortion of competition (OJ C 10, 
15.1.2009 p.2).” see OECD, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” at page 22
119D Schäfer and KF Zimmermann „Bad Bank(s) and Re capitalization of the Banking Sector“ (2009) 
Discussion Paper 897 of DIW Berlin <http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/3656>
120Such a move, in their opinion, would „ create transparency, avoid the high expense of pricing distressed assets, 
and insure that shareholders are the first ones to bear the cost of failure. The risk of moral hazard would also be 
effectively limited.“ 
121They also argue that “with the value of their toxic assets written down to zero, a number of banks would no 
longer meet the legislated core capital requirement. The government should take a stake in these banks in order 
to re capitalise them if they are unable to acquire sufficient private funds within a predetermined period of time.” 
a binding commitment to how long it has to sell its shares in the good bank following 
the closure of the bad bank. 
• All “systemically relevant” banks should be identified and required to participate in 
the plan.”
In  evaluating  the  above  proposals,  several  considerations  should  be  taken  into  account, 
namely:
i) The need to prevent and limit undue distortions of competition
ii) The need to facilitate exit strategies – by providing incentives for banks to look for 
alternative sources of capital.
The logic of the valuation of assets at a “zero-price” - assets for which no market is available 
–  hence  at  zero  cost  for  the  government122 should  serve  to  prevent  a  situation  whereby 
taxpayers burdens are minimised as far as possible. In their opinion, the German government's 
use of government bonds to compensate the bank for the transfer of the toxic assets to the bad 
bank burdens and encumbers taxpayers’ with future debt owned by the participating bank.123
However, a balance needs to be struck between the desire to prevent future debt being accrued 
by the participating bank (such future debt being transferred to tax payers) and the need to 
ensure the  prevention  and limitation  of  undue distortions  of  competition.  Furthermore,  in 
respect of the rescued component of the bank, there is need to provide incentives to banks to 
look for alternative capital by requiring a sufficiently high level of remuneration for State re 
capitalisation  -   such that  these  incentives  enable  State  capital  to  be  redeemed  when the 
market provides for such redemption.124
iv) Re capitalisation Schemes in Respect of Non Fundamentally Sound Institutions 
and the Grant of State Capital: The Objective of Fostering Competition Overriding the 
Need to Promote Financial Stability?
Why should financial institutions whose problems are attributable to inefficiencies, poor asset 
liability management or risky strategies not be accorded the same treatment as those whose 
viability problems are exogenously induced (and also related to extreme conditions which 
prevail  in the financial  market)  as far  as such “non fundamentally sound” institutions are 
considered to be systemically relevant?
122 Schäfer and Zimmerman argue that troubled assets should be valued based on current market prices 
prior to their take over and that troubled assets, for which there is no market, should be valued at “zero price”.
123Other challenges which a public „bad bank“ should be prepared to address, in their opinion include: „The 
transparent removal of troubled assets – which is considered necessary to ensure that the rescued bank has real 
prospects  for  a  fresh  start.  Second,  minimisation  of  the  costs  of  the  bailout  for  the  taxpayer.  Third,  the 
establishment of measures  aimed at  preventing future materialisation of incentives  or new opportunities for 
opportunistic behaviour.“ A means of achieving this, in their view, would be through the implementation of bad 
bank model which should limit the potential for “hold-up” problems whilst making it clear to shareholders and 
executives that entrepreneurial failure is a real possibility.“
124 See paragraph 31 of the Re capitalisation Communication
Section  2.3  paragraphs  43  and  44  of  the  Re  capitalisation  Communication  highlights 
safeguards which are available where the grant of State capital to non fundamentally sound 
institutions  are approved. Banks which would require more far  reaching restructuring and 
which  are  considered  not  to  be  fundamentally  sound  are  subject  to  more  stringent 
requirements  than  fundamentally  sound  financial  institutions  (which  would  require  less 
restructuring). Such stringent requirements include:
− The requirement that remuneration should “in principle reflect the risk profile of the 
beneficiary and be higher (for non fundamentally sound banks) than for fundamentally 
sound banks - without prejudice to the possibility for supervisory authorities to take 
urgent action where necessary in cases of restructuring.”125
− The acceptability and approval of use of State capital for  non fundamentally sound 
banks being dependent on the condition of either a bank's winding-up or a thorough 
and  far-reaching  restructuring,  including  a  change  in  management  and  corporate 
governance where appropriate. 126
The Commission in its Communication explicitly states that  „Notwithstanding the need to 
ensure financial stability, the use of State capital for these banks (non fundamentally sound 
financial institutions) can only be accepted on the condition of either a bank's winding-up or a 
thorough and far-reaching restructuring,  including  a change in management  and corporate 
governance where appropriate.“127
Does  this  infer  that  the  Commission  is  prepared  to  override  the  paramount  objective  of 
financial stability – by according greater prominence to the goal of fostering competition? 
This  might  initially  appear  to  be  the  case.  As  highlighted  in  the  second  section  of  its 
predecessor paper128, financial  institutions whose problems are attributed to “inefficiencies, 
poor  asset-liability  management  or  risky  strategies”  and  which  are  considered  to  be 
systemically relevant, should benefit from state aid where restructuring of such institutions 
occur – to the extent that  senior management (or indeed the entire  management)  of those 
institutions are replaced.
Such intentional safeguard by the Commission whilst ensuring that competition is not unduly 
distorted, also serves as a warning to “too big to fail firms” that guaranteed government or 
central bank intervention in the case of impending financial difficulties does not serve as an 
excuse for complacency or reckless risk taking behaviour. Such a move by the Commission is 
therefore aimed at deterring moral hazard whilst fostering competition.
125See paragraph 44 which furthermore adds that “Where the price cannot be set to levels that correspond to the risk 
profile of the bank, it would nevertheless need to be close to that required for a similar bank under normal market 
conditions. “
126“As a result, either a comprehensive restructuring plan or a liquidation plan will have to be presented for these 
banks within six months of re capitalisation. As indicated in the Banking Communication, such a plan will be assessed 
according to the principles of the rescue and restructuring guidelines for firms in difficulties, and will have to include 
compensatory measures.”
127See  paragraph  44  of  the  Recapitalisation  Communication.  (Communication  from  the  Commission  —  The 
recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and 
safeguards against undue distortions of competition )
128See M Ojo, “Liquidity Assistance and the Provision of State Aid to Financial Institutions” (2010) Munich 
RePEc and SSRN Working Papers
IV. Comparison  between  the  ECB  Recommendation  and  its  application  by  the 
Commission  in  the  Re  capitalisation  Communication  (specifically  with  Annex  to 
Communication) where Commission explains how it determined the price of equity – 
balancing the “real value” with the “market value” in a crisis context.
According to paragraph 18 of the Re capitalisation Communication, the Commission while acknowledging that the 
current  exceptional  market  rates  do  not  constitute  a  reasonable  benchmark  for  determining  the  correct  level  of 
remuneration of capital, is also of the view that re capitalisation measures by Member States should take into account 
the  underestimation  of  risk  in  the  pre-crisis  period. Without  this,  public  remuneration  rates  could  give  undue 
competitive advantages to beneficiaries and eventually lead to the crowding out of private re capitalisation.
Recommendations of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB)
The  Recommendations  of  the  European  Central  Bank129 included  a  proposal  for  “a 
methodology  for  benchmarking  the  pricing  of  State  re  capitalisation  measures  for 
fundamentally sound institutions in the Euro area”.  Whilst focus in the Recommendations is 
specifically  directed  at  the  importance  of  effective  re  capitalisation  -  for  purposes  aimed 
consolidating  financial  stability  and  facilitating  unimpeded  flow of  credit  within  the  real 
economy,  emphasis  is  also  placed  on  the  need  to  sustain  “a  level  playing  field  between 
competing banks” as well as pricing which is market oriented .130
The Commission’s appreciation of the Recommendations are reflected under paragraph 17 of 
the Re capitalisation Communication – however it draws attention to the need for guidelines 
and conditions aimed at providing direction in respect of banks which are not fundamentally 
sound.  Whilst  the  ECB  Recommendations  focussed  on  fundamentally  sound  financial 
institutions, the Re capitalisation Communication “extends guidance to conditions other than 
remuneration rates and to the terms under which banks which are not fundamentally sound 
may have access to public capital.
The Re capitalisation Communication achieves this aim through section 2.3 paragraphs 43- 45 
which specifically provide for rescue re capitalisations of non fundamentally sound financial 
institutions. Before  proceeding  with  a  more  detailed  discussion  of  this  section,  elements 
which  should  be  considered  when  determining  the  remuneration  of  fundamentally  sound 
financial institutions will be analysed.
Such elements are set out under paragraph 23 of the Re capitalisation Communication. For 
fundamentally  sound  financial  institutions,  the  determination  of  overall  remuneration,  as 
provided by paragraph 23, requires a consideration of the following elements:
(a) current risk profile of each beneficiary ;
(b) characteristics of the instrument chosen, including its level of subordination; risk and all 
modalities
of payment ;
(c) built-in incentives for exit (such as step-up and redemption clauses);
(d) appropriate benchmark risk-free rate of interest.
129 “The Recommendations of its Governing Council of 20 November 2008” See Communication from the 
Commission — The re capitalisation of financial institutions (1) in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the 
minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition, paragraph 16
130 ibid
In respect of State re capitalisations, paragraph 24 stipulates that remuneration is not expected 
to be as high as prevailing market levels since such levels would not provide an adequate 
indication  of  what  could  be  regarded  as  “normal  market  conditions.”-  in  this  sense,  the 
Commission is giving consideration to the conditions induced by the recent Financial Crisis – 
within a crisis context. As a result, the Commission highlighted its willingness to accept the 
price  for  re  capitalisations  of  fundamentally  sound  banks  at  rates  which  exist  below the 
prevailing  market  rates.131 Such  a  move,  according  to  the  Commission,  was  aimed  at 
facilitating access to such instruments – as well as restoring financial stability and ensuring 
lending to the real economy.
Whilst recognising the need for remuneration rates to operate at rates which are below the 
prevailing market rates, the Commission also acknowledges the need for parity between the 
total  expected  return  on  re  capitalisation  to  the  State  and  current  market  prices.  In  the 
Commission’s  view,  minimisation  of  excessive  discrepancies  between  the  total  expected 
return on re capitalisation to the State and current market prices since the total expected return 
on re capitalisation should:132
- Avoid the pre-crisis under-pricing of risk
- reflect the uncertainty about the timing and level of a new price equilibrium
- provide incentives for exiting the scheme and 
- minimise the risk of competition distortions between Member States, as well as 
between those banks which raise capital on the market today without any State aid.”
Further a remuneration rate which is not too remote from prevailing current market rates 
would help prevent “crowding out re capitalisation through the private sector – as well as help 
in restoring such rates to the usual market conditions.133
In contrast with the remuneration conditions for fundamentally sound financial institutions – 
as set out above,  section 2.3 paragraph 44,  in accordance with paragraph 43 of the same 
section,134 provides  that  “remuneration  should  in  principle,  reflect  the  risk  profile  of  the 
beneficiary and be higher than for fundamentally sound banks.”
The Commission  appeared  to  relax  its  stipulation  in  respect  of  non fundamentally  sound 
banks  -  regarding  the  need  for  more  stringent  requirements  of  such  institutions  where  it 
provided for situations whereby price cannot be set at levels which correspond to the risk 
profile of the bank.135
However, it  re-iterates its more restrictive stance in the grant of re- capitalisation to such 
banks where it  indicates its willingness to override its preference for the need to promote 
financial stability by stating that “ the use of State capital for these banks can only be accepted 
on the condition of either a bank's winding-up or a thorough and far-reaching restructuring, 
including a change in management and corporate governance where appropriate.” 136
131 see ibid at paragraph 24
132 ibid at paragraph 25
133 ibid
134 Which provides that „the re capitalisation of banks which are not fundamentally sound should be subject to stricter 
requirements.”
135 See ibid which provides that “Where the price cannot be set to levels that correspond to the risk profile of the 
bank, it would nevertheless need to be close to that required for a similar bank under normal market conditions.”
136 Consequently,  it  adds,  “either  a  comprehensive  restructuring  plan  or  a  liquidation plan  will  have  to  be 
presented for these banks within six months of re capitalisation.“ ibid
Other safeguards aimed at preventing undue distortions of competition, which are provided by 
the Commission under paragraph 45, in respect of non fundamentally sound banks, include “a 
restrictive policy on dividends (including a ban on dividends at least during the restructuring 
period), limitation of executive remuneration or the distribution of bonuses, an obligation to 
restore and maintain an increased level of the solvency ratio compatible with the objective of 
financial stability, and a timetable for redemption of State participation.”137
Remuneration rules applied in HRE
Non fundamentally sound financial institutions acquired through nationalisation.
1) Share holder’s usual remuneration - since it was highlighted that SoFFin was 100% 
HRE
2) As HRE was a “distressed bank”, no market conform remuneration expected – at least 
in the short term for provision of capital.
Facilitating Exit
According  to  paragraph  31  of  the  Re  capitalisation  Communication,  “Re  capitalisation 
measures need to contain appropriate incentives for State capital to be redeemed when the 
market so allows: The simplest way to provide an incentive for banks to look for alternative 
capital  is  for  Member  States  to  require  an adequately high remuneration  for  the  State  re 
capitalisation. For that reason, the Commission considers it useful that an add-on be generally 
added to the entry price determined to incentivise exit. A pricing structure including increase 
over time and step-up clauses will reinforce this mechanism to incentivise exit.”
HRE is also exceptional in the sense that the State has already acquired the undertaking. If the 
undertaking  had  been  seeking  to  acquire  State  capital,  there  would  be greater  reasons  to 
encourage an exit from the continued dependence on State capital – via higher remuneration 
(which is not the case with HRE).
According to paragraph 6 of the Re capitalisation Communication, „a capital injection from 
public sources providing emergency support to an individual bank may also help to avoid 
short term systemic effects of its possible insolvency.  In the longer term, re capitalisation 
could support efforts to prepare the return of the bank in question to long term viability or its 
orderly winding-up.“ With HRE, the Commission held that „for a distressed bank, no market-
conform remuneration can be expected, at least in the short-term, for such provision of capital 
and  that  in  line  with  the  Re  capitalisation  Communication,  such  a  situation  required  a 
thorough and far-reaching restructuring.”138
137 “Until redemption of the State, behavioural safeguards for distressed banks in the rescue and restructuring 
phases should, in principle, include: a restrictive policy on dividends (including a ban on dividends at least 
during  the  restructuring  period),  limitation  of  executive  remuneration  or  the  distribution  of  bonuses,  an 
obligation to restore and maintain an increased level  of the solvency ratio compatible with the objective of 
financial stability, and a timetable for redemption of State participation.”
138See  European  Commission,  „State  Aids  n°  C  15/2009  (ex  N  196/2009),  N  333/2009  & N  557/2009  – 
Germany  Hypo  Real  Estate  –  Extension  of  Formal  Investigation  Procedure,  and  Temporary  Find  Capital 
Injections Compatible“ at paragraph 53.
Source:  Annex to  the  Communication  from the Commission  — The Re capitalisation  of 
Financial  Institutions  in  the  Current  Financial  Crisis:  Limitation  of  Aid  to  the  Minimum 
Necessary and Safeguards Against Undue Distortions of Competition.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2009:010:0002:0010:EN:PDF
V. Re capitalisation and Current Impediments faced in the United States.
a) Measures Aimed at Rescuing Ailing U.S Markets
On October 14 2008, the following „watershed“ measures aimed at rescuing the ailing U.S. 
Markets were announced by the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC:139
− the Capital Purchase Program programme"
− the FDIC Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program
− the Federal Reserve's  Commercial Paper Funding Facility
„In respect of the Capital Purchase Program, the Treasury140 announced it would channel $250 
billion of its $700 billion reserves under The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
(“EESA”)  to  purchase  $125  billion  of  senior  preferred  shares  in  nine  major  financial 
institutions,  with the remaining $125 billion available for equity injections into qualifying 
U.S. controlled banks, savings associations, and certain bank and savings and loan holding 
companies engaged only in financial activities that elect to participate before 5:00 pm (EDT) 
on November 14, 2008.“141
„In respect of the FDIC Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, the FDIC announced142 it 
would temporarily  guarantee,  for a  fee,  all  newly issued senior  unsecured debt  of banks, 
thrifts  and  certain  holding  companies,  and  provide  full  coverage  of  non-interest  bearing 
deposit transaction accounts, regardless of dollar amount.“143
„The  Federal  Reserve  released144 additional  details  about  its  Commercial  Paper  Funding 
Facility,  including the fact  that it  would begin funding purchases of commercial  paper on 
October 27. This facility complements the Federal Reserve's existing credit facilities to help 
provide a liquidity backstop to U.S. issuers of commercial paper.“145
139 See „TARPOONED: The Re capitalization of the US Financial Industry „October 16, 2008 Dewey and Le 
Boeuf Publications  <http://www.dl.com> page 1 of 18 and also "Joint Statement by Treasury, Federal Reserve 
and FDIC" – October 14, 2008 <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1207.htm>
140 See "Treasury Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program Description." – October 14, 2008.
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1207.htm
141ibid
142 See ibid and " FDIC Announces Plan to Free Up Bank Liquidity: Creates New Program to Guarantee
Bank Debt and Fully Insure Non-Interest Bearing Deposit Transaction Accounts." – October 14,
2008. http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08100.html
143See „TARPOONED: The Re capitalization of the US Financial Industry „October 16, 2008 Dewey and 
LeBoeuf Publications  <http://www.dl.com> pages 1 and 2 of 18
144 See ibid and Federal Reserve Press Release, October 14, 2008:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081014b.htm
145ibid
Further series of initiatives implemented by the Treasury Department, as part of its Financial 
Stability Plan which alongside the American Recovery and Reinvestment  Act provide the 
foundations for economic recovery include:146
− Efforts to Improve Affordability for Responsible Homeowners
− Consumer and Business Lending Initiative to Unlock Frozen Credit Markets
− The Launch of the Capital Assistance Program
b). Addressing the Challenges Posed by Legacy Assets
One major reason why (despite these efforts)hurdles still need to be overcome by the financial 
system in order to achieve economic recovery relates to the problem of “legacy assets” – 
„both real estate loans held directly on the books of banks (“legacy loans”) and securities 
backed by loan portfolios (“legacy securities”).  These assets create uncertainty around the 
balance sheets of these financial institutions, compromising their ability to raise capital and 
their willingness to increase lending.“147
According to the Treasury, „the challenge posed by these legacy assets began with an initial 
shock due to the bursting of the housing bubble in 2007, which generated losses for investors 
and banks. Losses were compounded by the lax underwriting standards that had been used by 
some lenders and by the proliferation of complex securitisation products, some of whose risks 
were not fully understood. The resulting need by investors and banks to reduce risk triggered 
a wide-scale de leveraging in these markets and led to fire sales. As prices declined, many 
traditional investors exited these markets, causing declines in market liquidity.“148
In March 2009, the "public/private partnership investment programme" was announced by the 
Treasury – under which “the government is to provide basically all funds – as well as bearing 
nearly all risks involved. The use of the private sector to price the assets is compensated by a 
process whereby private investors would obtain rewards based on their performance, through 
equity participation, alongside the Treasury.  The public/private investment programme had 
the potential of generating $500 billion in purchasing power to buy legacy assets - with the 
potential to expand to $1 trillion over time through an injection of $75 – 100 billion of Tarp 
capital as well as capital from private investors.”149
c. The Public-Private Investment Program for Legacy Assets
To address the challenge of legacy assets, Treasury – in conjunction with the Federal Deposit 
Insurance  Corporation  and  the  Federal  Reserve  revealed  the  Public-Private  Investment 
Program as part of its efforts „to repair balance sheets throughout the financial system and 
146US Department of the Treasury, „„Public Private Investment Program“ 
<http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/ppip_fact_sheet.pdf> and „Treasury Department Releases Details 
on Public Private Partnership Investment Program“ <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg65.htm>
147ibid
148„As a result, a negative economic cycle has developed where declining asset prices have triggered further de 
leveraging, which has in turn led to further price declines. The excessive discounts embedded in some legacy 
asset prices are now straining the capital of U.S. financial institutions, limiting their ability to lend and increasing 
the cost of credit throughout the financial system. The lack of clarity about the value of these legacy assets has 
also made it difficult for some financial institutions to raise new private capital on their own.“ see ibid.
149US Department of the Treasury, „„Public Private Investment Program“ 
<http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/ppip_fact_sheet.pdf>
ensure that credit is available to the households and businesses, large and small, that will help 
towards the goal of achieving recovery.“150
“Three Basic Principles define the Public-Private Investment Program:151
− Maximizing  the  Impact  of  Each  Taxpayer  Dollar:  First,  by  using  government 
financing in partnership with the FDIC and Federal Reserve and co-investment with 
private sector investors, substantial purchasing power will be created, making the most 
of taxpayer resources.
− Shared Risk and Profits With Private Sector Participants: Second, the Public-Private 
Investment  Program  ensures  that  private  sector  participants  invest  alongside  the 
taxpayer, with the private sector investors standing to lose their entire investment in a 
downside scenario and the taxpayer sharing in profitable returns.
− Private Sector Price Discovery:  Third, to reduce the likelihood that the government 
will overpay for these assets, private sector investors competing with one another will 
establish the price of the loans and securities purchased under the program.”
The Merits of This Approach as highlighted by the Treasury derive from the fact that “it is 
superior to the alternatives of either hoping for banks to gradually work these assets off their 
books or of the government purchasing the assets directly. Simply hoping for banks to work 
legacy assets off over time risks prolonging a financial crisis, as in the case of the Japanese 
experience. But if the government acts alone in directly purchasing legacy assets, taxpayers 
will take on all the risk of such purchases – along with the additional risk that taxpayers will 
overpay if government employees are setting the price for those assets.”
d. The Troubled Assets Relief Programme (TARP)
The increased hostility to the financial sector within the United States, as illustrated by Wolf, 
was revealed through Congress' 2009 discussion of penal retrospective taxation of bonuses for 
all recipients of government money under the troubled assets relief programme (Tarp).152
Wolf is of the opinion that even though there are doubts as to whether this scheme would end 
the „chronic under-capitalisation of US finance“ that it might make clearer how much further 
the assets held on longer-term banking books need to be written down.
He also puts forward two reasons why this scheme could get in the way of the necessary re 
capitalisation:  First,  that  Congress  may  decide  the  scheme  made  re  capitalisation  less 
important; second and more important, that the scheme is likely to make re capitalisation by 
government even more unpopular.
Furthermore,  he  draws  attention  to  the  danger  that  the  scheme  would,  at  best,  achieve 
something not particularly important - making past loans more liquid - at the cost of making 
harder something that is essential – re capitalising banks.
150“Using $75 to $100 billion in TARP capital and capital from private investors, the Public-Private Investment 
Program will generate $500 billion in purchasing power to buy legacy assets –with the potential to expand to $1 
trillion over time.” US Department of the Treasury, “Public Private Investment Program: The Public-Private 
Investment Program for Legacy Assets“ <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/ppip_fact_sheet.pdf> 
151ibid
152M Wolf, „Why a Successful US bank Rescue is Still So Far Away“ Financial Times 24 March 2009
This  in  his  view  is  significant  since  „the  government  had  ruled  out  the  only  way  of 
restructuring the banks' finances that would not cost any extra government money: debt for 
equity swaps, or a true bankruptcy.  „ He argues that the one way out could be through a 
means whereby ( if possible) the greater transparency offered by the new funds allowed the 
big banks to raise enough capital from private markets . A successful outcome, moreover, 
would still imply the need for investors to provide „ vast sums required by huge and complex 
financial institutions, with a proven record of mismanagement“ - which in his view, would 
only be possible after many years (after which trust in confidence in such financial institutions 
had been restored) .
„The problems for the U.S. financial system started with increased defaults of sub prime and 
other non traditional mortgage loans as the housing boom came to an end. During the housing 
boom of the 2000s, risky mortgage loans were securitised, structured into various types of 
financial  products,  and  distributed  to  investors  all  around  the  world.  However,  the  risk 
diversification  was  far  from  complete  and  many  financial  institutions  increased  their 
ownership of real estate related assets. As the underlying mortgages become non-performing, 
the values of their derivative securities declined, and the financial institutions that held the 
securities started to suffer losses. Given the leverage in the financial system these losses were 
significant relative to the equity of these firms (Greenlaw et al., 2008). By early 2008, the 
losses started to jeopardize the viability of large financial  institutions.  In March 2008, the 
Bear Stearns nearly failed and was rescued by JP Morgan with financial assistance from the 
Federal Reserve System.“153
Treasury's  Shift  in  Focus from  Buying Troubled/Toxic  Assets  to  Buying bank shares  to 
increase the bank capital Injecting Equity Capital
“In view of the need to rescue numerous vitally economically important financial institutions 
through ad hoc measures, it became apparent that a massive, comprehensive and coordinated 
government rescue effort was urgently needed. On September 19, Treasury Secretary Henry 
Paulson unveiled his proposal (the "Paulson Proposal") to use $700 billion in taxpayer money 
to purchase toxic mortgage-related assets that were weighing heavily on the balance sheets of 
financial institutions.”154
The Treasury’s interest in purchasing non-performing assets from major financial institutions 
was formalized as the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) which was included in the bill 
for the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA).155
„Section  101  of  EESA  establishes  the  now  well-known  Troubled  Asset  Relief  Program 
(‘‘TARP’’) and authorizes the Treasury to purchase, and to make and fund commitments to 
purchase,  troubled  assets  from financial  institutions  up to  an amount  not  exceeding  $700 
153T Hoshi and A K Kashyap, “Will the U.S. Bank Re capitalization Succeed? Eight Lessons from Japan“ NBER 
Working Paper No. 14401 August 2009 at page 5
154„The rationale, as vigorously advocated by Treasury and the Federal Reserve,  was that once freed from the 
enormous burden of these illiquid assets, financial institutions would be able to gradually resume the flow of 
credit and breathe life back into the frozen financial markets.“
See „TARPOONED: The Re capitalization of the US Financial Industry „October 16, 2008 Dewey and 
LeBoeuf Publications  <http://www.dl.com> pages 5 of 18
155T Hoshi and A K Kashyap, “Will the U.S. Bank Re capitalization Succeed? Eight Lessons from Japan“ NBER 
Working Paper No. 14401 August 2009at page 6
billion outstanding at any one time, as adjusted for the operation of the companion guarantee 
program.“156
e. Adopting the Emergency Economic Stabilization Legislation
„On October  3,  the U.S.  House of Representatives  voted 263-171 to pass the EESA bill. 
Within hours, President Bush signed the bill and EESA was part of the law of the land. In a 
calculated  political  response,  on  October  1,  the  Senate  voted  74-25  to  approve  an 
“amendment” to the EESA bill that spliced onto a largely unchanged House version of the 
EESA bill a raft of stalled tax bills, namely the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 
2008 and Tax Extenders and Alternative Minimum Tax Relief Act of 2008. The Senate’s 
move added up to $150 billion in additional costs and several hundred pages to make the 
EESA bill about 450 pages long. The only substantive change made to the EESA bill that 
failed in the House was to add a provision that increased until December 31, 2009 the amount 
of deposit insurance provided by the FDIC from $100,000 to $250,000. This amended version 
of the EESA bill was sent back to the House, which approved it 263-171 on October 3.“157
„The Treasury started to shift the focus from the original idea of buying troubled assets to 
buying bank shares to increase the bank capital. After the Republicans lost the election, the 
Treasury  announced  that  the  original  TARP  plan  of  buying  troubled  assets  would  be 
postponed indefinitely. On November 25, the Federal Reserve announced the creation of its 
Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending Facility (TALF). The TALF allowed holders of AAA-
rated  asset-backed  securities,  backed  by  recently  originated  consumer  and  small  business 
loans, to qualify for a non recourse loan from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.“158
„As the change in administrations was approaching in January 2009, press reports indicated 
that the Obama administration was set to announce the creation of an “aggregator bank” that 
would buy bad assets so that they could be removed from the balance sheets of banks. When 
the first plans of the administration were announced, the aggregator bank idea was dropped, in 
part reportedly because the funding requirements would have been huge.“159
f. Lessons on Re capitalisation
At least three of eight lessons from the Japanese history which appear to have been ignored 
or have to be relearned – as identified by Hoshi and Kashyap, include:160 
156See „TARPOONED: The Re capitalization of the US Financial Industry „October 16, 2008 Dewey and 
LeBoeuf Publications  <http://www.dl.com> pages 2 and 3 of 18
157“The  keystone  of  the  bailout  legislation  has  from the  start  been  the  Troubled  Asset  Relief  Program  or 
“TARP.”  Less  than a  week  after  the introduction of  the original  Paulson Proposal,  on September  23,  both 
Secretary Paulson and Chairman Bernanke testified before the Senate Banking Committee with respect to the 
continuing financial crisis and the rescue measures proposed by the Treasury.” ibid at page 5 of 18
158T Hoshi and A K Kashyap, “Will the U.S. Bank Re capitalization Succeed? Eight Lessons from Japan“ NBER 
Working Paper No. 14401 August 2009 at page 7; „By December, the proposed merger between Merrill Lynch 
and Bank of America seemed to have encountered an impasse and Bank of America was privately telling the 
government that it was hesitant to proceed. The merger was ultimately consummated on January 1st, but by the 
time it was completed the government had agreed to provide additional assistance. On January 16, the Treasury, 
FDIC, and the Federal Reserve announced a package of guarantees, liquidity access and capital for Bank of 
America. During December 2008, TARP funds were also offered to non-financial firms for the first time.“
159ibid
160T Hoshi and A K Kashyap, “Will the U.S. Bank Re capitalization Succeed? Eight Lessons from Japan“ NBER 
Working Paper No. 14401 August 2009at pages 32-33
− i) The hesitation of the banks to admit publicly their need for government assistance 
(some of the original TARP institutions were adamant in their insistence that they did 
not need public support).
− ii)  The  performance  of  initial  TARP capital  purchases  without  the  observation  of 
rigorous audit and inspection requirements
− iii) The third area where the Japanese history appears to have been ignored regards the 
willingness to nationalize an institution and wind it down. A major constraint on the 
government throughout the crisis, in their opinion, has been the lack of a  resolution 
procedure that could work for a complex financial holding company.“161
VI) CONTROLLED WINDING-UP OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Pursuant to Section 5, paragraph 43 of the Banking Communication, controlled liquidation 
(which is possible in collaboration with the contribution of public funds), may be undertaken:
- Either as a second step – after rescue aid to an individual financial institution has been 
granted (when it becomes clear that the latter cannot be restructured successfully) or;
- In one single action
“Controlled winding-up may also constitute an element of a general  guarantee scheme.”162 
The need to  minimise moral  hazard (through the exclusion of shareholders  and particular 
classes of creditors from the receipt of benefit of any aid within the context of the controlled 
winding up procedure) and the avoidance of undue distortions of competition are amongst 
several considerations which are of vital importance.163
a) Liquidation Aid to Bradford and Bingley Plc
With  the  financial  turmoil  in  September  2008 and its  impact  on the  liquidity  position  of 
Bradford and Bingley, the UK authorities decided to pursue a wind-down procedure whereby 
the retail deposit book was to be sold while an orderly wind-down of the remainder of the 
161It is argued that „in contrast, in Japan, a major piece of the legislation was enacted during the crisis precisely 
to make it possible to fail major financial institutions. The Japanese government also used this authority in at 
least two very visible cases. Federal Reserve and Treasury officials have repeatedly asked Congress to pass a bill 
creating the authority to resolve a large, complex financial institution; ibid at page 33. Furthermore, two of the 
major lessons from Japan involved the use and design of asset management companies. The U.S. record in this 
regard is mixed. The U.S. has avoided the Japanese mistake of trying to do small asset purchases to solve a 
serious capital shortage problem. See ibid at page 35.
162 „ For instance, where a member state undertakes to initiate liquidation of the financial institutions for which 
the guarantee needs to be activated. The assessment for such a scheme and of individual liquidation measures 
taken under such a scheme are to be applied along the same lines, mutates mutandis, as set out for guarantee 
schemes.” See Section Five paragraph 43-44 of the Banking Communication.
163 Furthermore, i) “the liquidation phase should be limited to the period strictly necessary for orderly winding 
up; ii) The beneficiary financial institution should merely continue with ongoing activities and not pursue any 
new activities – as long as it continues to operate ; and iii) The banking licence should be withdrawn as quickly 
as possible.” See ibid paragraphs 46 and 47. 
business  was  to  be  undertaken  for  the  purposes  of  maximising  recoveries  –  as  well  as 
minimising the burden on taxpayers.164
A package of rescue measures which comprised of the following elements was accepted by 
the Commission : 165
a) the working capital facility; 
b) the guarantee arrangements to certain wholesale borrowings, derivative transactions 
and wholesale deposits existing as on 28 September 2008; and 
c) the public  support  resulting  from the Transfer  Order  containing  two aid elements: 
firstly, an aid to B&B through the payment of £612 million for the sale of the transfer 
package, and secondly, an aid to the transferred economic entity, which corresponds to 
the ability for this entity to remain in the market.
Furthermore, the aid package including the sale to Abbey was found to be compatible rescue 
aid under Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, in line with the Community guidelines on State aid for
rescuing and restructuring firms in difficulty.166
As well as the submission of a liquidation plan which was based on the assumption that an 
orderly winding down process (for Rumpco) would take place, reasons for undertaking the 
route of a controlled winding down process – as opposed to uncontrolled insolvency were also 
provided.  An orderly  winding down process  would not  only “maximise  the  value  of  the 
remaining assets and minimize the amount of necessary state aid”, but would also facilitate 
the repayment of the working capital facility as well as the statutory debt. Furthermore, the 
reasons for the choice of a controlled winding down process necessitated a consideration of 
the legislation in force when the decision to wind down Bradford and Bingley (now Rumpco) 
was taken and such reasons include:167
- An absence of a “strictly defined time-frame” for large and complex liquidations such 
as that of B & B.
- The fact that B & B would not have obtained the working capital facility which was 
required  in  order  to  pay  Rumpco  creditors  –  had  B  &  B  chosen  the  route  of 
uncontrolled  insolvency.  An  uncontrolled  insolvency  procedure  would  also  have 
resulted in liquidation shortfall with respect to debt owed to such creditors.
- A uncontrolled  insolvency procedure  would  have  endangered  the  prospects  of  the 
recovery of full value of statutory debt.
- Rumpco’s  uncontrolled  insolvency would have undermined financial  stability  –  as 
well as market confidence.
In deciding on measures required for the winding down of Rumpco, proposals were made by 
the UK to convert  prevailing  prolonged or extended measures  (which had been approved 
initially as rescue measures) into measures required for the liquidation of Rumpco.168
164 See European Commission, “State aid N 194/2009 –United Kingdom: Liquidation Aid to Bradford and 
Bingley Plc at paragraph 4 page 2.
165 See Rescue Decision and ibid.
166 Hereinafter "the Rescue and Restructuring Guidelines " See European Commission, “State aid N 194/2009 –
United Kingdom: Liquidation Aid to Bradford and Bingley Plc at paragraph 6
167 See ibid at paragraphs 13 and 14
168 „Those measures were supplemented by a commitment to provide a capital injection if necessary to 
ensure that Rumpco continued to meet the minimum capital regulatory requirements throughout the regulatory 
process.” Further, it was held that “in line with the rescue decision the measures constitute State aid pursuant to 
b) Legal basis for the compatibility assessment and the choice of Article 107 (3)(b) 
TFEU
Initially,  the rescue decision had concluded that it  was not considered necessary to assess 
whether  Article  107(3)(b)  TFEU would  apply since  the  rescue  measures  had been  found 
compatible on the basis of Article 87(3)(c) EC and in particular the Rescue and Restructuring 
Guidelines.169
Against the background of the recent global financial crisis (whereby it was widely accepted 
that “a serious disturbance in the economy of Member States had occurred and that measures
supporting banks are appropriate to remedy this disturbance”)170 and taking into account the 
objective of the proposed aid measures, namely, the facilitation of Rumpco's wind-down, it 
was held that the legal basis for the assessment of these measures should be Article 107(3)(b) 
TFEU.
In addition to an observance of the Banking Communication - which sets out the State aid 
rules applicable to the liquidation of financial institutions in the current crisis, the following 
conditions are considered necessary in order for the compatibility of liquidation aids with 
Article 107(3) (b) TFEU to be established:171
- Demonstration that the aid enables the bank to be effectively wound up in an orderly 
fashion,
- Own Contribution and burden sharing
- Measures aimed at limiting the distortion of competition
As  well  as  arriving  at  the  conclusion  that  all  three  conditions  had  been  satisfied,  the 
Commission also decided not to raise any objections to the aid measures (in the form of the 
working capital facility, the guarantees and the possible capital injection) on the ground that 
they constitute State aid which is compatible with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU.172
Article 107(1) TFEU. According to this provision State aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through 
State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods is, insofar as it affects trade between Member States.”
169 See European Commission, “State aid N 194/2009 –United Kingdom: Liquidation Aid to Bradford and 
Bingley Plc section 4 paragraph 44
170 “This having been confirmed in various Commission communications such as the  Communication on the  
application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current  
global financial crisis(hereinafter "the Banking Communication"), its Communication on the re capitalisation of  
financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and safeguards  
against undue distortions of competition (hereinafter "the Re capitalisation Communication"), and its
Communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial  
sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules (hereinafter "the Restructuring Communication").”
171 See European Commission, “State aid N 194/2009 –United Kingdom: Liquidation Aid to Bradford and 
Bingley Plc section 4 paragraphs 49-56 at pages 10-12
172 See ibid section 5 paragraph 63
VII) PROVISION OF OTHER FORMS OF LIQUIDITY ASSISTANCE
According to section 6 of the Banking Communication173 which deals with the provision of 
other  forms  of  liquidity  assistance,  member  states  are  permitted  to  implement 
“complementary forms of liquidity support – along with the provisions of public funds (which 
includes funds from the central bank)” in situations where “acute” liquidity problems are in 
need of redress. Furthermore, general measures which are implemented and are “open” to all 
market players on a comparable and equal basis (for example lending provided on an equal 
footing) and which do not constitute selective measures (which are in favour of individual 
banks), are often considered by the Commission as falling outside the boundaries of State 
rules and as such do not require notification to the Commission.174
The Increased Prominence of the Role Assumed by Central Banks – The Impact of the Recent 
Financial Crisis.
According to recent  observations,  some aspects  of the more prominent  role which central 
banks  have  assumed  since  the  recent  crisis  (such  a  role  being  partly  attributed  to 
circumstances triggered by the recent financial crises), are likely to become more permanent 
during the aftermath of the Crisis.175
Unconventional measures which were introduced by advanced economies in response to the 
latter stages of 2008 include liquidity provision to banks on extra ordinary terms – particularly 
for longer periods of maturity, intervention in selected credit markets – a measure aimed at 
supporting secondary market liquidity and the outright purchase of bonds – such purchase 
being aimed at improving financing conditions beyond that which can be achieved by policy 
rate cuts.176
A change in supervisory responsibilities and functions of regulators – with more powers being 
transferred to central  banks, is also being witnessed in jurisdictions such as the UK. This 
response has been prompted by the realisation that the allocation of responsibilities between 
the tripartite arrangement (consisting of the single financial services regulator – the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA), the Treasury and the Bank of England) did not function efficiently 
and timely177 to avert the crisis generated during the events leading to the collapse of Northern 
173See paragraph 51of the Banking Communication
174„The Commission considers for instance that activities of central banks related to monetary policy, such as 
open market operations and standing facilities, are not caught by the State aid rules. Dedicated support to a 
specific financial institution may also be found not to constitute aid in specific circumstances. The Commission 
considers that the provision of central banks' funds to the financial institution in such a case may be found not to 
constitute aid when a number of conditions are met, such as:
— the financial institution is solvent at the moment of the liquidity provision and the latter is not part of 
a larger aid package,
— the facility is fully secured by collateral to which haircuts are applied, in function of its quality and 
market value,
— the central bank charges a penal interest rate to the beneficiary,
— the measure is taken at the central bank's own initiative, and in particular is not backed by any 
counter guarantee of the State.” ibid
175 H Hannoun  “The Expanding Role of Central banks Since the crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010 Bank 
for International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 1
176 ibid at page 3
177 It is also highlighted that a key reason for the failure of the tripartite system of financial oversight during 
Northern  Rock’s  collapse was a  failure by the tripartite  body to properly identify and monitor  risks to  the 
Rock.  Greater  powers  have  been  transferred  to  the  Bank  of  England  who  used  to  be 
responsible for bank supervision before this role was transferred to the FSA in 1997.
“The Bank of England’s focus on meeting the inflation target” it is contended, “distracted it 
from monitoring other important  variables  that  affect  financial  stability.”178 In response to 
some of the issues brought to light as a result of the recent crisis, the Bank is now to be given 
responsibility  for  systemic  oversight.179 As  a  result,  the  grant  of  further  supplementary 
oversight functions to the Bank of England in relation to the associated subject of prudential 
regulation, it is further argued, will be desirable.180 Even though a change in supervisory roles 
– with respect to present regulator and the central bank is also considered to be a possibility in 
Germany181, a radical change such as that which is currently taking place in the UK, is not 
foreseen.  This in partly attributable  to the fact  that  the Deutsche Bundesbank,  the central 
bank, was responsible for numerous vital  supervisory functions and was more engaged in 
bank supervision – in contrast to the position which existed with the Bank of England.
Whilst  the  need  for  a  greater  role  for  central  banks  in  facilitating  financial  stability  and 
promoting  systemic  oversight  is  a  positive  and  justified  development,  the  growing 
intervention of central banks in financial markets gives rise to concerns. The recent Financial 
Crisis witnessed a series of rescues and restructuring of financial institutions – such being 
facilitated by State aids – hence government intervention. Central bank intervention provides 
an invaluable source of liquidity funding in terms timeliness (particularly in view of urgent 
scenarios)  when  compared  to  State  aids.  The  promptness  of  central  banks  in  addressing 
financial  system  as  whole.  See  Shearman  and  Sterling  LLP,  „UK  Government  Proposals  for  Financial 
Regulatory Reform“ Financial Institutions  Advisory and Financial Regulatory Group Publications 7 June 2010
178 ibid; “Under EU legislation currently being discussed in Brussels, there may in the foreseeable future, be a 
new  financial  regulatory  framework  that  aims  to  strengthen  prudential  supervision  across  the  EU.  Macro-
prudential supervision would be the responsibility of a new European Systemic Risk Board that would, with the 
assistance of the European Central Bank, be tasked with giving early warning of any growing systemic risks and, 
where necessary, recommending action to deal with such risks. Micro-prudential supervision would be carried 
out by the European System of Financial Supervisors, made up of national supervisors, and by three European 
Supervisory Authorities for the banking, securities and insurance and occupational pensions sectors. In order for 
the new EU supervisory framework to work properly, the responsibilities of the Bank of England and the FSA 
would need to correspond with those of the new EU institutions and their counterparts in other member states.”
179 Ibid; Furthermore, “central banks are increasingly being put in charge of overseeing systemic risk. This is 
because, as “the ultimate provider of liquidity”, they are in a unique position to focus on system-wide risks and 
obtain an integrated view of both the individual financial institutions and the financial system as a whole. Even 
when financial  institutions  look strong on an  individual  basis,  systemic  risk can  emerge  as  a  result  of  the 
interconnectedness  of  financial  institutions,  markets  and  infrastructures.  The  macro  prudential  approach  to 
supervision has to take account of these externalities. 
Two recent examples of this approach are the creation of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) at 
the ECB, and the proposed Financial Stability Oversight Council in the United States. The ESRB will be an 
independent  body responsible  for  conducting  macro prudential  oversight  of  the  European  Union’s  financial 
system as a whole. It  is thus expected to fill a gap in the ability of financial regulators to detect, assess and 
contain the build-up of systemic risks. Similarly, the Financial Stability Oversight Council of regulators in the 
United  States  is  expected  to  identify  systemically  significant  companies  and  monitor  markets  for  the 
development of asset price and credit booms that might threaten financial stability. According to these proposals, 
the  Fed  would  be  responsible  for  the  supervision  of  systemically  important  financial  institutions.”  see  H 
Hannoun  “The Expanding Role of Central banks Since the crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010 Bank for 
International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 6
180 See Shearman and Sterling LLP, „UK Government Proposals for Financial Regulatory Reform“ Financial 
Institutions  Advisory and Financial Regulatory Group Publications 7 June 2010
181 H Hannoun “The Expanding Role of Central banks Since the crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010 Bank 
for International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 6
serious liquidity problems faced by financial institutions has contributed to the realisation that 
its role in promoting financial stability should be accorded greater prominence. At the same 
time, it appears to be widely acknowledged that “the role of the lender of last resort facility 
should not be used to address individual bank insolvencies.”182
The “classic” view – under which it is held that “central banks should lend freely at a penalty 
rate as well as against good collateral”183 is considered to serve as a means of ensuring that :184 
− The lender of last resort is only used for illiquid banks
− In emergency situations
A restricted application of the lender of last resort facility (as much as possible) is not only 
justified on the basis that moral hazard could occur – since banks or financial institutions 
experiencing financial difficulty will almost always expect to be bailed out when such a need 
arises (and hence will be induced to take greater levels of risks than the case would have been 
if no such facility had existed). It is also argued that “the sustained bloating of their balance 
sheets  means  that  central  banks  still  dominate  some  financial  market  segments  thereby 
distorting the pricing of some important  bonds and loans, discouraging necessary market-
making by private individuals and institutions.”185
Should lender of last resort arrangements be granted to a wider extent under complementary 
arrangements  which support re capitalisation schemes than those which support  guarantee 
schemes or vice versa?
Lender of last resort arrangements should be granted to illiquid systemically relevant financial 
institutions in emergency situations. This is partly attributed to the fact that Paragraph 6 of the 
Re  capitalisation  Communication,  interestingly,  provides  for  “problems  of  financial 
institutions  facing insolvency as  a  result  of  their  particular  business  model  or  investment 
strategy.“
Other reasons why the lender of last resort facility should be used for emergency situations 
and systemically relevant institutions in particular, are attributed to the role played by central 
banks during the recent crisis – during which the role of central  banks “in stepping in to 
replace disrupted and dislocated funding markets”186 was highlighted. In drawing attention to 
182 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” at 
page 6 of 28
183 „Another reason why central banks need to unwind their intervention in financial markets is that they are not 
immune to credit risk. The conventional rule is that central bank lending must be fully collateralised. Unsecured 
lending is a risky art, requiring discretion, which is incompatible with the principles of transparency and equal 
treatment in access to central bank credit. Nor is it consistent with the accountability of the central bank.” See H 
Hannoun  “The Expanding Role of Central banks Since the crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010 Bank for 
International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 9
184 See Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” at 
page 6 of 28
185 H Hannoun  “The Expanding Role of Central banks Since the crisis: What are the Limits?” June 2010 Bank 
for International Settlements Publications http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100622.pdf?noframes=1 at page 7
186 „During the crisis, central banks had to step in to replace disrupted and dislocated funding markets. Severe 
tensions in interbank, foreign exchange swap and some segments of securities markets – including, lately, 
government bond markets – hampered the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The usual relationship 
between key policy rates and the rates applicable in the real economy was disrupted, and the main tool for 
influencing financing conditions in the real economy did not work properly.” ibid
such developments, the need to avoid dependency on the central bank – to the extent that it 
does not become the “lender of first resort” (whenever the markets reveal signs of impeding 
financial failures), is also emphasised.187
Given the  scale  of  government  intervention  and State  rescues  which  occurred  during  the 
recent  crisis  –as  well  as  the  prominence  accorded  to  measures  aimed  at  preventing  and 
limiting distortions of competition, calls have been made for competition authorities to take 
on more formidable roles in designing and implementing exit strategies. In order to foster 
competition as much as possible, it is proposed that ”governments should provide financial 
institutions with incentives to prevent them from depending on government support once the 
economy begins to recover.”188 Such incentives, it is further argued, could assume the form of 
rescue measures having conditions built into them – conditions which would induce financial 
institutions to opt for private sources of investments (rather than public sources of investment) 
when economic conditions return to normal.189
According to key findings  published by the OECD, the design of competition  policies  in 
banking within several jurisdictions in Europe  has undergone substantial reform at national 
level – with very unprecedented changes occurring over the last two decades.190 
The  recent  crisis  has  also  witnessed  unprecedented  levels  of  intervention  –  in  terms  of 
government  intervention.  The  OECD's  findings  also  highlight  the  fact  that  competition 
authorities  around the  world  have also been  compelled  to  participate  in  these actions  for 
reasons other than those related to intense time pressure for action, - whilst questions relating 
to the application of competition policy to the financial sector have arisen.191 
Whilst the findings highlight the controversy generated by some who argue that competition 
rules should be suspended for the duration of the crisis - thus allowing regulators to focus 
only on the objective of safeguarding the stability of the financial system, it concludes that 
whether  competition is  desirable  at  all  when there is  a systemic  crisis,  is  a matter  which 
generally, is in need of clarification.192 
187 ibid at page 9
188 Organisation for Economic Co operation and Development, „ Competition and the Financial Markets” at page 
10 
189 An example is provided where governments could make it un lucrative for beneficiaries to rely on public 
capital injections any longer than they have to – by imposing restrictions on them (restrictions such as escalating 
dividends or interest rates). At some point, it is further argued, private sources of equity will become more 
desirable; see ibid
190For example, in Italy since December 2005 competition policy in banking is no longer enforced by the Bank 
of Italy but rather by the competition authority as in all other sectors. In the Netherlands, the Competition Act of 
1998 applies  to  the  banking  sector,  but  only  since  2000.  See  Organisation  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development, “Competition and the Financial Crisis” at page 12
191ibid at page 13
192“Others have instead emphasised the importance of applying strict competition rules in the current crisis as a 
means of ensuring a level playing field and a coordinated reaction to the crisis – as well as avoiding a futile race 
for subsidies between countries to attract depositors and investors. Moreover, the long-term effects of relaxing 
competition policy can  be  serious.  Mergers  that  lead  to  very concentrated  markets  in  particular  are  almost 
impossible to reverse.”; ibid
Conclusion
The successful winding up of financial institutions and the „weaning“ financial institutions 
from state aid is crucial, not only for the purposes of achieving the desired level of stability, 
but also to avoid distortions of competition.
Should the Commission and Member States apply the methodology193 stipulated in the Re 
capitalisation Commission to safeguard an equitable determination of the acquisition price of 
capital  of banks by Member  States,  and would such consideration  provide a vital  key to 
determining the real value of State aid and the best possible price for which capital should be 
sold or privatised?
In determining the appropriate level of remuneration of capital, the following considerations 
should be taken into account:
- the need to minimise burdens to tax payers
- the  valuation  of  troubled  assets  (and  particularly  assets  for  which  no  market  is 
available) at a “zero price” – since such assets should be realistically valued rather 
than  being  over  valued  at  an  amount  which  is  not  only  unaffordable  for  the 
participating bank (at the time), but which has also has the potential of encumbering 
future tax burdens.
- The “under estimation of risk in the pre-crisis period”194 – this being the case even 
though the Commission acknowledges that “current exceptional market rates do not 
constitute a reasonable benchmark for determining the correct level of remuneration of 
capital.” Such a consideration of the under estimation of risk in the pre crisis period, in 
the Commission’s opinion, would also serve to minimise the occurrence of situations 
whereby  public  remuneration  rates  could  give  undue  competitive  advantages  to 
beneficiaries  –  which could  eventually  result  in  the  “crowding out”  of  private  re-
capitalisation.
- The need to facilitate exit  strategies – whereby the remuneration demanded by the 
State is adequately high enough to provide the participating bank with incentives to 
look for alternative capital where market conditions allow such redemption of State 
capital.
193„Ordinary shares are remunerated by uncertain future dividend payments and the increase of the share price 
(capital  gain/loss),  both of  which ultimately depend on the expectations of future cash flows/profits.  In  the 
current situation, a forecast of future cash flows is even more difficult than under normal conditions. The most 
noticeable factor, therefore, is the quoted market price of ordinary shares. For non-quoted banks, as there is no 
quoted share price, Member States should come to an appropriatemarket-based approach, such as full valuation.“
194 See paragraph 18 of the Re capitalisation Communication
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